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ABSTRACT—In recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has called
on Congress to vest agencies with litigation “gatekeeper” authority across a
range of regulatory areas, from civil rights and antitrust to financial and
securities regulation. Agencies, it is said, can rationalize private
enforcement regimes through the power to evaluate lawsuits on a case-bycase basis, blocking bad cases, aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding
private enforcement capacity in ways that conserve scarce public resources
for other uses. Yet there exists strikingly little theory or evidence on how
agency gatekeeper authority might work in practice. This Article begins to
fill that gap by offering the first systematic study of an often invoked but
little studied example: Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of qui tam
litigation brought pursuant to the False Claims Act (FCA). Using an
original dataset encompassing some 4000 qui tam lawsuits filed between
1986 and 2011, this Article offers evidence on numerous issues that have
occupied recent judicial, scholarly, and popular debate, including the extent
to which DOJ utilizes its various oversight tools, the mix of factors that
drives DOJ intervention decisions, and whether DOJ’s seemingly powerful
impact on case outcomes can be ascribed to its merits-screening or meritsmaking role. The analysis mostly rejects heated claims that DOJ
decisionmaking has a partisan political cast or is unconnected to case merit.
At the same time, however, it uncovers substantial evidence that DOJ
makes case decisions strategically, separate and apart from pure merits
considerations, in response to simple resource constraints, judicial threats
to its ability to police collusive relator–defendant settlements, and the
identity (and corporate power) of the defendant. These findings have
important implications for judicial evaluation of qui tam suits as well as
leading FCA reform proposals. More broadly, the analysis opens up new
theoretical and empirical avenues for thinking about optimal regulatory
design at the border of litigation and administration, with applications well
beyond the FCA.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial developments in the American
regulatory state in recent decades is a marked shift away from
administrative regulation and enforcement and toward private lawsuits as a
regulatory tool.1 Champions of that trend assert that deputizing “private
attorneys general” to enforce legal mandates taps private information,
resources, and expertise while serving to check agency capture by regulated

1
See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010).
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parties.2 Critics counter that private enforcement yields wasteful and
uncoordinated regulatory efforts and trenches on government enforcement
prerogatives.3 From an institutional-design perspective, a core challenge is
how to exploit private enforcement’s virtues while mitigating its vices.4
More broadly, how can we achieve optimal coordination of public and
private enforcement mechanisms?
One way to rationalize private enforcement regimes, some contend, is
to grant public agencies the power to oversee private litigation efforts.5 In
particular, agencies might be given the authority to manage private
enforcement efforts on a case-by-case basis, evaluating private lawsuits and
either joining and co-prosecuting them or dismissing them outright.6 Armed
with such authority, agencies can efficiently manage private enforcement
capacity, delegating enforcement duties to capable and well-incentivized

2
See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95, 107 (2005).
3
Id. at 114.
4
See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam
Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1253 (2012) (framing institutional-design challenge as
“harnessing” in twin sense of leveraging and constraining).
5
See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2013) (offering a taxonomy of different types of agency gatekeeper proposals).
6
Numerous commentators have advanced such proposals across a range of policy contexts, as to an
already existing litigation regime or in combination with a proposal to grant individuals a private right
of action to enforce legal mandates on the government’s behalf. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander,
Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1517–18 (1996) (securities);
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52–53, 72, 76 (2002) (environmental protection
and securities); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 198–202 (securities); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1384, 1387–88, 1421–24 (2000) (civil rights); William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust
Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 796 (2001) (antitrust);
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 941 (2001) (antitrust);
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by
Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 55 (2009–2010) (securities); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities
Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (securities); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement
of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1012–13 (2010) (securities); Bartonv H.
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 206, 233–
34 (environmental protection); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX
LAW. 357 (2008) (tax); Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud 46
(2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (securities).
As I explain elsewhere, we might call this type of agency authority retail gatekeeper authority. As an
alternative, agencies might be vested with wholesale gatekeeper authority in which they use their
synoptic perspective to weigh costs and benefits and determine whether private rights of action should
lie at all. See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 28–29 (coining the “wholesale” and “retail” terminology); see
also Stephenson, supra note 2, at 95 (arguing that agencies should be given greater authority “to create
and delimit private rights of action”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of
Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1996) (same).
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private enforcers and thus conserving scarce public resources for other
uses.7
But a long literature on public bureaucracies also suggests reason for
caution. Given that private enforcement is designed at least in part to
counter possible agency capture, bringing agencies back into the equation
risks returning the fox to the henhouse. Calls for expanded agency
oversight authority also raise concerns about the capacity and will of
agencies to optimally perform gatekeeper duties, whether because of
limited ability to gauge case merit, pursuit of political rewards, or imperfect
managerial control over line-level personnel.8
Despite growing debate around these issues, there exists strikingly
little theory or evidence on how agency gatekeeper authority should or
would work in practice. This Article begins to fill that gap by offering the
first comprehensive study of an often invoked but little-studied example:
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of lawsuits brought
pursuant to the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA). The
FCA’s qui tam provisions empower private persons, dubbed “relators,” to
sue private parties alleging fraud against the United States and earn a cash
“bounty” equal to a portion of any proceeds returned to the federal
treasury.9 The Act also grants DOJ expansive gatekeeper powers. Among
other things, DOJ can intervene in qui tam lawsuits, taking primary control
over their prosecution, or even dismiss them out from under private relators
entirely.10 This unique public–private hybrid enforcement approach has
become the gold standard among those who advocate a heightened agency
oversight role across a range of litigation contexts, including civil rights,11
environmental protection,12 and financial and securities regulation.13 None

7
Cf. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 879 (1985)
(proposing that the EPA “cede[] control over routine penalty actions to private enforcers, and
concentrate[] its efforts on the novel, difficult and expensive areas of enforcement”); Wendy
Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law, 68 LAND ECON.
28, 46 (1992) (“The very existence of private enforcement allows the public sector greater flexibility in
targeting its limited enforcement resources.”); Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private
Participation in Regulating and Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen
Involvement, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 469 (1999) (“By delegating to private citizens authority to
perform certain tasks, . . . the EPA can relieve some of the burden on its dwindling budget thereby
allowing it to concentrate on areas where its resources and expertise are more sorely needed.”);
Stephenson, supra note 2, at 109 (noting that agencies can “economize” on scarce resources by
selectively relying upon private enforcement where it makes sense to do so).
8
For detailed theoretical discussion of each of these concerns, including the possibility of
regulatory capture noted previously, see infra Part I.B.
9
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006) (setting forth FCA’s qui tam provisions).
10
See id. § 3730(c)(1)–(2) (vesting the government with these powers).
11
See Gilles, supra note 6, at 1387–88.
12
See Bucy, supra note 6, at 76; Thompson, supra note 6, at 233–34.

1692

107:1689 (2013)

Public Regulation of Private Enforcement

of these calls, however, is accompanied by more than superficial
consideration of the merits or demerits of the FCA approach.14
Even beyond its frequent invocation, the FCA’s qui tam regime is
worthy of study. The regime is big and growing fast, producing nearly
3000 lawsuits and roughly $12 billion in recoveries in the last five years
alone—numbers that rival, and even eclipse, those achieved by private
enforcement efforts in other, much-analyzed areas of law such as securities
and antitrust over the same period.15 And qui tam’s explosive growth has
stoked heated debate about DOJ’s discharge of its statutory gatekeeper
duties in particular.
One flashpoint is how to interpret the fact that most qui tam recoveries
come where DOJ has intervened while most cases in which DOJ declines
to intervene end in dismissal. Qui tam’s critics assert that declined cases
should thus be presumed meritless and accuse DOJ of too meekly
exercising its authority to terminate cases or argue that relators should be
precluded from pursuing cases at all where DOJ refuses to become
involved.16 Some federal courts adopt a similar view, explicitly inferring a
13
See Bucy, supra note 6, at 76; Fisch, supra note 6, at 198–202; Rose, supra note 6; Arlen, supra
note 6, at 2–4.
14
For instance, Rose makes a thought-provoking, article-length call to vest the SEC with
gatekeeper powers akin to what DOJ wields under the FCA, but devotes only a few pages to potential
challenges to such an oversight regime. See Rose, supra note 6, at 1358–63; see also Bucy, supra note
6, at 53–54 (offering a brief descriptive overview of qui tam filing and recovery trends as evidence that
the FCA’s hybrid public–private enforcement approach has been “extraordinarily successful as a
regulatory tool”); Gilles, supra note 6, at 1421–24 (concluding without substantial empirical or other
analysis that the FCA’s hybrid public–private enforcement model is the “most effective” approach to
deterring fraud).
15
For the most up-to-date aggregated statistics on qui tam filings and recoveries, see Civil Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics—Overview: October 1, 1987–September 30, 2012 (Oct. 24,
2012), http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf [hereinafter Fraud
Statistics], which reported approximately $2.8 billion in qui tam recoveries in 2011 and $3.4 billion in
2012, with more than 600 new filings in both years. For securities litigation statistics, see Ellen M.
Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2012 Review and Analysis,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 2 (2013), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/
REVIEW_1995-2012/Settlements_Through_12_2012.pdf, which reported $2.9 billion in settlements in
2012 and $1.4 billion in 2011, and Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action
Filings: 2012 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 3 (2013), available at http://securities.
stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2012_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Securities_Class_Action_
Filings_2012_YIR.pdf, which reported 152 filings in 2012 and 188 filings in 2011. For antitrust filing
statistics, see Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.41.2010, ST. U. N.Y.
ALBANY (2010), http://sourcebook.mybigcommerce.com/sections/courts/antitrust-cases-filed-in-u-sdistrict-courts-1975-2012/, which reported an average of roughly 650 private antitrust lawsuits in 2009
and 2010.
16
See Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the
Civil False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 826 (2012) (“The immense disparity between
recoveries in qui tam actions in which the Government intervened and those in which it did not suggests
that most qui tam actions brought without government intervention assert meritless or frivolous
claims.”). For other versions of this argument as well as the claim that DOJ too stingily uses its
termination authority, see Christopher M. Alexion, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates: Controlling Qui
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lack of case merit from DOJ declinations, with many more presumably
making implicit judgments along those same lines.17 In stark contrast, qui
Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 404 (2012); J. Randy Beck,
The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 638–
40 (2000); William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in
Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 238 (1998); William E. Kovacic,
Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1799, 1849 (1996) [hereinafter Kovacic, Monitoring Devices]; Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral
Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 334 (2007); and Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the
Department of Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act,
76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1256–58 (2008).
17
See ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 51 (2d ed. 2009)
(“Unfortunately, a declination is often a death knell for the case, because many judges view it as a
statement by the government on the merits even though it is not.”). Many court decisions imply a
connection between DOJ case-election decisions and case merit. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jamison
v. McKesson Corp., 649 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that DOJ decision to intervene as to
seven defendants but not more than 400 others meant that the unintervened claims “presumably lacked
merit”); United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 242 n.31 (1st Cir.
2004) (noting that “the government’s decision not to intervene in the action also suggested that
[relator’s] pleadings of fraud were potentially inadequate”); United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem.
Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the United States had declined to intervene in the
suit, . . . which could be interpreted . . . as substantially weakening [the] case”); Riley v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 775 n.38 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[I]n cases . . . in which
the government has declined to intervene, it is likely that that decision is not a result of limited
resources, but instead because the government has decided for some reason that to pursue the claim is
inappropriate.”); United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“[A] defendant’s reputation is protected to some degree when a meritless qui tam action is filed,
because the public will know that the government had an opportunity to review the claims but elected
not to pursue them.”); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Attorney General’s
refusal ‘to enter the suit may be taken as tantamount to the consent of the District Attorney to dismiss
the suit.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Laughlin v. Eicher, 56 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D.D.C. 1944)));
United States ex rel. Fender v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2000)
(“The decision by the Attorney General not to intervene in and conduct the lawsuit is tantamount to
consent by the Attorney General to have the action dismissed.” (citing Minotti, 895 F.2d at 104));
United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 78 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (suggesting that “the
reason the Government chose not to intervene in this matter is its recognition that Relator’s
allegations . . . were a ‘stretch’ under the False Claims Act”); United States v. Fiske, 968 F. Supp. 1347,
1350 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (“[T]he filing and service requirements protect defendants’ reputations to some
degree by making public the United States’ decisions not to intervene and thereby flagging some
meritless allegations.” (citing Pilon, 60 F.3d at 999)).
Other courts take a more measured view and assume that intervention decisionmaking is driven by a
range of factors, from bureaucratic resource constraints to a simple risk–benefit calculation. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Attorney General may choose not to intervene “for any number of reasons” and that “a
decision not to intervene may not [necessarily be] an admission by the United States that it has suffered
no injury in fact, but rather [the result of] a cost–benefit analysis” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th
Cir. 1997) (noting that intervention decision was based on “cost–benefit analysis”); United States ex rel.
Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (D.N.M. 2000) (noting that intervention decision
may have been driven by a “lack of available Assistant United States Attorneys” or “respect for the skill
of the relator’s attorneys”); United States ex rel. Roberts v. Lutheran Hosp., No. CIV. 1:97C–174, 1998
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tam’s champions complain that DOJ intervention decisions border on
random and assert that high success rates in intervened cases stem not from
DOJ’s case-screening prowess but rather its litigation leverage, particularly
its unique ability to threaten defendants with debarment from future
government business (a “corporate death sentence” for many government
contractors) in cases it joins.18 Some have also accused DOJ of shielding
politically connected companies from FCA liability, particularly defense
contractors accused of fraud in connection with controversial military
ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.19 In short, while DOJ oversight plainly
plays a critical role, it remains unclear whether the FCA’s hybrid public–
private enforcement structure should be seen as an exemplary design or a
cautionary tale.
WL 1753335, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 1998) (noting that “the government has limited resources to
devote to FCA investigations”).
18
See Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public Health and
Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 241
& n.27 (2006) (noting “corporate death sentence” of debarment for health care providers); Tara L.
Ward, Note, Amending the Qui Tam Intervention Provisions: Setting Debar Higher?, 38 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 297, 302–04 (2008) (describing government’s debarment power under federal procurement
regulations).
19
See The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most
Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“In light of the politicization of the Justice Department,
many wonder whether it has resisted pursuing certain false claims cases for political reasons—most
notably those involving contracting fraud related to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.”). DOJ Civil
Division head Tony West seemed to imply a lack of prosecutorial vigor during the previous
Administration in recent congressional testimony: “Using the False Claims Act, the Department is
aggressively pursuing fraud in connection with the wars in Southwest Asia. Thus far, we have reached
settlements in cases involving goods and services provided in connection with the war effort amounting
to $77 million, and since January 2009, procurement fraud cases have accounted for approximately
$645 million in recoveries—more than the Department’s procurement fraud recoveries in 2007 and
2008 combined.” Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14–15
(2010) [hereinafter Civil Division] (statement of Tony West, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice). It is also noteworthy that DOJ’s annual press release announcing its 2011 FCA
case-outcome statistics made particular mention of DOJ’s enhanced efforts in war-related cases. See
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ1665.html. Newspaper accounts have sounded many of the same themes. See Carrie Johnson, A
Backlog of Cases Alleging Fraud, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at A1 (“Critics argue that the delays are at
least partly the result of foot-dragging by Justice and the federal agencies whose position it represents,
especially in the touchy area of suppliers that may have overbilled the government for equipment, food
and other items used by troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.”); Yochi J. Dreazen, Lawyer Uses Civil WarEra Law to Go After Firms for Corruption, but Administration Won’t Help, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006,
at B1 (quoting qui tam relator attorney as follows: “The Bush Administration has made a conscious
decision to sweep the cases under the rug for as long as possible . . . . And the more bad news that
comes out of Iraq, the more motivation they have to do so.”); Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Rebuffed FoodFraud Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2007, at A6 (noting allegation by qui tam relator attorney that DOJ
“has turned down numerous Iraq fraud cases to protect the administration from political damage”).
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Using an original dataset encompassing more than 4000 qui tam cases
filed since 1986, this Article moves beyond anecdote and begins the
process of adjudicating competing claims about agency gatekeeping in
general and DOJ’s qui tam oversight in particular. Deploying multiple
identification strategies, I offer evidence on three issues that have occupied
recent debate. First, my findings confirm that DOJ rarely uses its
termination authority, raising questions about DOJ’s will or capacity to
play a welfare-maximizing role. Second, I reject heated claims about DOJ
politicization, finding what is at best only tentative evidence that DOJ
oversight has a partisan political cast, whether in defense-procurement
cases or otherwise. Third, I find that DOJ appears to have substantial
merits-screening capacity, contrary to the view that DOJ intervention
decisions are wholly arbitrary. At the same time, however, I uncover
substantial evidence that DOJ makes intervention decisions strategically,
separate and apart from pure “merits” considerations, in response to simple
resource constraints, judicial threats to its ability to police collusive relator–
defendant settlements, and the identity (and corporate power) of the
defendant. My analysis thus suggests that courts should exercise great
caution in drawing merits-based inferences from DOJ declination decisions
going forward.
More broadly, anatomizing DOJ intervention decisions highlights
underappreciated challenges in the optimal design of agency oversight
mechanisms, with applications to the FCA context and beyond. As just one
example, my twin findings that DOJ is resource-constrained yet
substantially more likely to intervene in cases brought by more
sophisticated, repeat plaintiffs’ counsel are striking, for they suggest a
potentially perverse allocation of public enforcement resources. This is
directly contrary to idealized models of hybrid public–private enforcement
in which public enforcers optimally manage private enforcement capacity,
delegating enforcement duties to competent and trustworthy private
enforcers and thus freeing up scarce public resources for other purposes.
My analysis suggests a reason: the FCA’s tiered bounty system, which pays
successful relators a higher bounty in cases DOJ declines in order to
encourage private enforcers to go it alone and serve an agency-forcing or
anticapture role, may undermine optimal agency reliance on private
enforcement by raising the “price” of delegation. The result is a basic
institutional-design trade-off: a legislator cannot incentivize private
enforcers to play an agency-forcing or anticapture role without distorting a
good faith agency’s ability to efficiently deploy private enforcement
capacity. In these and other ways, my analysis offers fresh perspective on
some classic puzzles of administrative law, particularly how to design
institutional structures that balance the need for administrative expertise
and some measure of bureaucratic autonomy with the demands of
democratic accountability.
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches an
informal theory of the optimal agency oversight role and develops some
testable hypotheses for likely deviations from that ideal. Part II provides a
descriptive overview of the FCA’s unique public–private hybrid structure
and summarizes a range of mostly anecdotal claims made about DOJ’s
oversight role within the regime. Part III presents the data and empirical
results. Part IV discusses some implications of my findings for proposals to
amend the FCA, assesses proliferating calls to export the FCA’s unique
public–private structure to other regulatory areas, and suggests ways to
revitalize scholarly debate around the optimal structure of law enforcement
at the border of administration and litigation.
I.

AGENCIES AS LITIGATION GATEKEEPERS:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. The Ideal Gatekeeper Role
Any attempt to construct a coherent analytical framework for
evaluating agency gatekeeper authority must first specify how an ideal
agency would use such powers. Put another way, if an ideal agency were
vested with the power to control or terminate private litigation efforts, what
core tasks would such an agency perform? The scholarly literature on
private enforcement’s merits and demerits suggests at least five
possibilities.
First, an ideal gatekeeper agency will use its gatekeeper authority to
quash or cabin what would otherwise be wasteful and inefficient private
enforcement efforts. Because a private enforcer will enforce whenever the
expected return exceeds her costs, she may do so even where the social
cost of enforcement (e.g., the transaction costs consumed by both sides,
including judicial resources) exceeds the social benefit.20 Put another way,
private enforcers do not exercise prosecutorial discretion. Profit-motivated
private enforcers may also seek to apply legal mandates in ways that go
beyond legislative purposes21 or inefficiently piggyback on public
enforcement efforts and one another.22 Finally, private enforcers may
20
See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (modeling this dynamic).
21
See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 22 (noting ways in which the interstitial and incremental nature of
private enforcement efforts can drive the elaboration of legal mandates in ways that frustrate democratic
control efforts); see also Stephenson, supra note 2, at 119 (“As neither the citizens bringing private
enforcement suits nor the judges who decide them are subject to electoral discipline, private
enforcement may undermine a valuable democratic feature of American governance.”).
22
See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 16 (noting longstanding concern that private enforcers will
“piggyback” on public enforcement initiatives or other private lawsuits in an effort to free ride on other
litigants’ work or take advantage of any adverse judgments that result); see also Stephenson, supra note
2, at 128 n.117 (citing long literature on “piggyback” actions); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class
Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass
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simply bring meritless claims, whether driven by irrational motives,
mistaken evaluation of case merit, or a desire to extract settlements by
threatening high discovery or other costs.23 Where such cases arise, an ideal
gatekeeper agency will terminate private enforcement efforts before
substantial costs have accrued or take over control of a case and steer it in
more public-interested directions.
A second core gatekeeper task is unique to the situation in which
private enforcers are deputized to collect fines on the government’s behalf
rather than damages: policing collusive settlements between private
enforcers and regulatory targets. Private enforcement regimes typically pay
private enforcers only a portion of any fines imposed as a way to reduce
private enforcement activity to something approximating a socially optimal
level. But doing so incentivizes private settlements for an amount greater
than the bounty but less than the full fine.24 An ideal gatekeeper agency will
thus step in and thwart collusive private settlements that threaten to dilute
deterrence or are otherwise inconsistent with the government’s goals.
The remaining gatekeeper tasks are more subtle. As just noted, an
ideal public enforcer will simply terminate private enforcement efforts that
lack merit or whose costs outweigh any benefits. But an agency gatekeeper
can still play an epistemic, merits-screening role in borderline cases. By
neither joining nor terminating a case whose social cost–benefit profile is
ambiguous, an ideal agency will signal its skepticism to courts and
highlight the need for careful judicial scrutiny and case development.25
A final pair of ideal gatekeeper tasks entails leveraging deficient (but
socially desirable) private enforcement efforts. In general, an ideal public
enforcer will maximally rely on fully competent and well-incentivized

Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2000) (noting concern about “coattail” actions and
considering their possible efficiencies); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with the assistance of Dana
Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 745, 763 (2003)
(empirically testing claims about “overlap between private and SEC suits”); Thomas E. Kauper &
Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and
Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1202–08 (1986) (same, in antitrust
context).
23
See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997)
(modeling incentive structures and informational challenges that yield frivolous lawsuits); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988) (same); Avery
Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3
(1990) (same); see also Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2000)
(arguing that “irrational plaintiffs” have a salutary effect because they counteract the repeat-play
advantages that defendants enjoy in complex litigation regimes).
24
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 24 (1975) (noting criticism that private enforcement “creates incentives for bribery and
corruption because the gain to the enforcer from enforcement is generally less than the offender’s
potential penalty”); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 105, 123 (1980) (noting same concern).
25
See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 39–40.
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enforcers, freeing up scarce public resources for other uses. But private
enforcement efforts may also prove deficient, typically for one of two
reasons.26
The first stems from failures in the market for the retention and
referral of legal services. Of particular concern are so-called “queuing”
effects in which the best qualified attorneys cherry-pick the highest
yielding cases, thus matching the best lawyers to the cases to which they
add the least value and leaving the remaining, more difficult cases to less
skilled counsel.27 Further mismatches may occur where sophisticated
plaintiffs’ counsel erroneously pass on a high quality case, leaving it to
lower order counsel in the queue, and enforcement targets, with full
information about the extent of illegality, respond by investing heavily in
defense. A public enforcer focused on achieving optimal deterrence will
compensate for the resulting “adversarial asymmetries” by joining and
leveraging the enforcement capacities of overmatched private enforcers
who cannot fully vindicate the public interest.28
A second reason private enforcement may prove deficient is scaling
problems. Because private enforcers will act only if the expected recovery
exceeds expected costs, they may not initiate enforcement at all where the
cost of doing so is high (e.g., where they suffer high psychic or other costs
from taking action, such as reporting on colleagues or engaging in

26

An implicit assumption in the discussion that follows is that counsel quality affects litigation
outcomes, which is relatively uncontroversial in the scholarly literature. See Sean Farhang & Douglas
M. Spencer, Economic Incentives for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation (Sept. 10,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1882245 (collecting literature); see also W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE
OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 85, 91 (1972) (finding
improved outcomes for individuals represented by more experienced counsel in juvenile proceedings);
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (finding that public defenders
achieve better outcomes for clients accused of murder than appointed counsel); Engstrom, supra note 4,
at 1267 (finding substantial returns to specialization and experience among plaintiff-side counsel in qui
tam litigation). But see D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J.
2118, 2150 (2012) (finding no improvement in litigation outcomes for individuals who were offered
and used representation from legal aid organizations in appeals of denials of unemployment benefits);
id. at 2175–82 & 2175 n.154 (reviewing literature on the effect of legal representation in civil disputes
and criticizing the methodology used therein).
27
See Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
363, 368 (1998) (noting how queuing effects ensure that “top contingent fee lawyers end up with
portfolios of better cases”); John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private
Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 280 (2007)
(noting the “queuing effect” within referral networks that leaves the hardest cases to “the middle or
lower ranks of lawyers,” with the result “that the best lawyers do not select the cases to which they
might be able to add the most value”).
28
See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 18, 40.

1699

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

“organizational dissent,”29 or where whistleblower protections are not
perfectly binding), even if post-initiation enforcement costs are low and
enforcement would improve social welfare.30 Scaling problems complicate
optimal calibration at the high end of the harm spectrum as well: private
enforcement may be deficient where the targeted harm—and, by extension,
available fines or damages—exceeds the malefactor’s ability to pay31 or
where well-resourced regulatory targets are able and willing to mount a
vigorous defense.32 Here, the ideal agency gatekeeper role is to secure
desired deterrence across the full spectrum of misconduct by committing to
assist such claims, thus inducing reluctant private enforcers with privately
held information about misconduct to come forward.
B. Deviations from the Gatekeeper Ideal
Table 1 corrals the above insights and characterizes the role of an
optimal, welfare-maximizing public enforcer with respect to each of the
five core gatekeeper tasks. As the rest of Table 1 reflects, however, there is
also good reason to be skeptical about the willingness of public enforcers to
optimally perform these tasks. Modern governance delegates enforcement
authority to administrative agencies that may or may not share ideal
policymaker goals. One possibility is deterrence-diluting corruption or
agency capture by regulated interests.33 A subtly different but potentially
more important insight is that a gatekeeper agency may allocate resources
with an eye to collecting political rewards by emphasizing production of

29

See generally Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 434, 461, 486–87 (2009) (coining the term “organizational dissent”
and noting the high psycho-emotional cost of whistleblowing).
30
See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 15; see also Polinsky, supra note 24, at 119–20 (noting possible
deficiency of private enforcement at low end of harm spectrum); David Kwok, Coordinated Private and
Public Enforcement of Law: Deterrence Under Qui Tam 12 (Feb. 8, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=
ALEA2010&paper_id=375 (same).
31
See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 7, at 42 (“Civil sanctions have a serious defect when
the assets of the firm are limited relative to its obligations.”); Polinsky, supra note 24, at 119 (noting
superiority of public enforcement where defendants are judgment proof).
32
See Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution of Antitrust in
the United States, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 187, 202 (2012) (noting that “risk-averse plaintiffs
with knowledge about illegal acts might be reluctant to file cases against resourceful enterprises”).
33
In its standard form, capture theory predicts that certain groups will systematically win out over
other groups in the regulatory process, either because they face more concentrated benefits or costs and
so have greater incentive to invest in information or lobbying efforts, or because they can better solve
the collective action problems that can stymie group-based political action. For recent and
comprehensive treatments of the capture concept, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., forthcoming 2013),
and STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008).
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certain observable bureaucratic outputs over others.34 The result is three
additional agency “types” beyond the optimal welfare-maximizer agency,
each with its own distinct maximand, and each deviating from the
normative ideal.

34

See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO
IT 251–53 (2000) (noting agency tendency to pursue certain observable bureaucratic outputs over
others). On political rewards more broadly, public choice scholars have long theorized that agencies
will seek to maximize their budgets—a view sometimes dubbed the “self-aggrandizement” hypothesis.
See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–42 (1971)
(offering the classic account of this view); GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 134–
36, 167–70 (1987) (same); see also Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932–34 (2005) (offering an updated and more skeptical view).
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For instance, Table 1’s rent-seeker agency will privilege total
monetary recoveries over harder-to-measure and empirically contestable
goals such as total illegal activity deterred or aggregate welfare gains.35
This is problematic, for the gatekeeper decisions of an agency that seeks to
maximize total recoveries will yield an overall enforcement strategy that is
not substantially different from that of profit-seeking private enforcers left
to their own devices.36 To that extent, a gatekeeper agency focused on
maximizing recoveries may perpetrate, rather than mitigate, socially costly
overdeterrence.
Other possible agency maximands can yield even more substantial
deviations from the gatekeeper ideal. A politicker agency will go a step
further than a rent-seeker agency, maximizing recoveries in which public
enforcers actively participate. The motive should be obvious: a press
conference touting yet another agency win may be better than one
announcing a mix of public and private successes, even where private
enforcers do not need assistance and marginal public enforcement
resources would be better spent elsewhere, producing either greater
deterrence or a larger recovery pie. Finally, Table 1’s belt-notcher agency
will maximize its win–loss ratio. It might do so because cherry-picking
strong cases and creating a substantial spread between win rates in cases it
joins and those it does not will confirm its pivotal role to political
overseers.37
35
See Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking
Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116 (2002) (modeling public enforcement as an effort to
maximally appropriate the rents of illegal conduct); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the SEC’s Bark
Worse than Its Bite?, NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2012, at 10, 10 (noting tendency of SEC to curry favor with
Congress by structuring enforcement activities with an eye to “obtaining greater aggregate penalties, in
order to obtain a larger budget”); John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?,
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 3, 2012, at 23, 24 (“[T]he SEC needs to be able to use objective metrics to justify its
request for budget increases. By bringing many actions and settling them cheaply, it can point to an
increase in the aggregate penalties collected, even if the median penalty is at the same time
decreasing.”); Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 646 (2010) (noting the tendency of internal and external
evaluators of SEC performance to employ “readily available evaluative heuristics,” including a focus on
“the number of cases brought by the Division, and, to a lesser extent, on the size of the fines collected
by the SEC”).
36
See Garoupa & Klerman, supra note 35, at 133–34 (comparing public and private enforcement
mechanisms where government seeks to maximize fine revenue and arguing that enforcement outcomes
and concomitant social welfare effects will not differ between the two except as to “very high” harm
misconduct or where public enforcement is substantially more or less costly than private enforcement).
37
For a recent and innovative argument that legislative oversight can lead to so-called
“accountability pathologies,” see Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Accountability
Pathologies in Public Law: Diagnosis and Treatment (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). A further analogy can be found in the economics literature on “high-powered incentives.” See
Daron Acemoglu, Michael Kremer & Atif Mian, Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments, 24
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 273, 292, 297 (2007) (theorizing that “high-powered incentives” linked to
performance can generate “unproductive signaling effort”). Agency use of a high win rate to keep
political overseers at bay might also be consistent with the view of some political scientists that
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To be sure, an agency might seek to maximize wins for other reasons.
Among other things, an agency might consider a neutral sorting-andsignaling role in which it focuses on case winnability to be most consistent
with its statutory mandate or its self-perceived role in a system of separated
powers. To that extent, it may not always be possible to distinguish a beltnotcher agency from an ideal, welfare-maximizing agency that sees itself as
a merits-signaling adjudicatory adjunct to the courts. And yet, maximizing
an agency’s win rate may not be the socially optimal approach. Easier-towin cases might be systematically smaller than more difficult cases if case
size correlates with complexity or defense-side deployment of resources.38
A win-maximizing agency might thus unduly focus scarce agency
resources on low-harm cases, leaving more consequential misconduct
undeterred.39
More broadly, none of Table 1’s alternative agency types will
optimally terminate inefficient private enforcement efforts. One reason is
that each agency type can be expected to privilege affirmative enforcement
successes over passive case termination, particularly where termination
costs, both actual and reputational, can be reliably shifted to the judiciary.40
agencies may adopt a position of “strategic neutrality,” deploying relatively objective decisionmaking
criteria (here, case winnability) to avoid taking political heat for their enforcement approach. See, e.g.,
GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY: INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY (2007) (finding substantial evidence for this
general proposition in OSHA inspection and enforcement patterns).
38
See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 5, 7 (2010) (finding relationship between case “stakes” and
plaintiff- and defendant-side litigation costs); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation
Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 330, 353 (2007) (offering evidence that
litigation costs tend to rise with case stakes and complexity); Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement of
Law, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 60, 81 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2d ed. 2009) (“Even without regulatory
capture, economizing practices by public enforcers reveal the presence of incentives to divert resources to
actions against firms less likely to be able to defend themselves.”).
39
See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement
Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 725 (2012) (finding that the SEC pursued smaller cases in
the area of broker-dealer regulation); Cox & Thomas, supra note 22, at 764, 777 (finding that the SEC
brought more enforcement actions against smaller firms than did private enforcers where there was no
parallel SEC action).
40
See Matthew, supra note 16, at 300 (noting a similar dynamic). Part of this is a continuation of
the logic of a self-aggrandizing agency: a politically conscious gatekeeper agency focused on
maintaining access to needed resources will not steer its efforts toward purely reactive case terminations
in preference to the pursuit of objective and observable measures of enforcement success. Moreover,
agencies, in addition to being “self-aggrandizing,” are also often excessively cautious regarding risks
within their regulatory bailiwicks and are thus just as likely to be “defensive” and “scandalminimizing.” James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 377–
78 (James. Q. Wilson ed., 1980); see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986) (“[R]egulation tends to be
excessively cautious (forcing investments in risk reduction far in excess of the value that individuals
place on avoiding the risks involved).”); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 370–71 (2003)
(summarizing the literature on “[t]he risk-avoiding bureaucrat”). A useful analogy here is the “bailout
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Worse, politically conscious agencies may in fact aid inefficient private
enforcement efforts, since even socially costly enforcement efforts will add
to recovery tallies or the agency’s win rate. Nor are such agencies likely to
engage in systematic efforts to leverage deficient private enforcement or
police collusive settlements except where doing so serves the agency’s own
instrumental goals.
Beyond Table 1, agency gatekeeping may deviate from the ideal not
because agencies lack the will to optimally perform oversight tasks but
because they lack the capacity to do so. One possibility is that an agency
vested with gatekeeper authority will simply be unable to accurately gauge
case merits, or do so any more quickly or cheaply than courts.41 Another
possibility is imperfect managerial control: careerist line-level prosecutors
who perform screening tasks may bias agency decisions toward larger and
more consequential cases, smaller and potentially more winnable cases, or
cases brought by more sophisticated private enforcers deemed to be better
litigation partners, all in search of résumé-burnishing successes.42
A final capacity-related problem is that even a good faith agency may
not be able to solve the commitment problem inherent in leveraging efforts.
Recall that an important part of an agency’s leveraging task is to induce
reluctant private enforcers to come forward with socially beneficial claims
they would not bring on their own by committing to support those claims,
effect” that legal scholars and political scientists have noted in the context of judicial review. See Justin
Fox & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing, 105 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 397, 397 (2011) (describing a “bailout effect” in which “judicial review may rescue elected
officials from the consequences of ill-advised policies”); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–58 (1999) (arguing that “judicial overhang” can distort
legislative behavior); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 261 (2006) (offering a similar account that likens judicial review
to an “insurance policy against erroneous legislative determinations,” thus creating a moral hazard
problem for legislative behavior). Another analogy is found in the classic concern that public regulators
are systematically biased against the more tangible harms that flow from Type II errors (i.e., “false
negatives” in the form of an erroneous conclusion that a dangerous product is safe) and in favor of less
observable Type I errors (i.e., “false positives” in the form of an erroneous conclusion that a safe
product is dangerous). See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 358–60 (2009) (summarizing the literature).
41
See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 41–49 (noting the inherently comparative nature of any inquiry
regarding the competence or capacity of agencies to perform gatekeeper tasks and questioning whether
agencies can gauge case merits any more accurately or efficiently than courts can).
42
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in
a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1106, 1115–16 (1995) (noting “the unique
difficulties associated with monitoring the behavior of government lawyers”); see also R. Preston
McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic
Analysis, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1863, 1872 (2008) (“[S]ome government actors are likely to be partly
motivated by factors other than efficiency, including career concerns . . . .”); id. (“In reality, the
government’s lawyers may have incentives to win (big) cases independent of their actual welfare
consequences.”); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1444–45 (1998) (noting tendency of civil rights prosecutors
to bring relatively small and politically uncontroversial cases).
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thus ensuring enforcement efforts across the full spectrum of misconduct.43
However, because public enforcers may not be able to credibly commit to
joining those efforts in the face of other enforcement opportunities, there is
a potential holdup problem: private enforcers rightly worried about being
left holding the bag will not surface the claims in the first place.44
*

*

*

The goal up to this point has been to fix ideas and generate testable
predictions about agency behavior. The resulting analysis has necessarily
traded in stylized types. In reality, a gatekeeper agency, particularly one
facing resource constraints, will likely pursue multiple objective functions
simultaneously, maximizing a weighted mix of total recoveries, public
recoveries, and its win rate. Note as well the uneasy relationship between
leveraging efforts and other core gatekeeper tasks. An enforcement agency
that seeks to husband private enforcement capacity by fully delegating
enforcement authority to competent private enforcers and leveraging the
litigation efforts of less competent ones risks muddying its merits signal
unless it has a way to distinguish for courts cases it has deliberately left to
private enforcers and cases of uncertain quality. Likewise, a meritssignaling agency must exercise its power to terminate truly meritless cases
or it risks sending a noisy or even illegible signal about case quality
regarding the rest. Future research—including more formal work—might
consider these and other possibilities.
II. THE CASE OF QUI TAM AND THE PUZZLE OF DOJ OVERSIGHT
The False Claims Act (FCA)45 is both an exemplar of the coordination
challenges in hybrid public–private enforcement regimes and a natural
laboratory to test Part I’s theoretical predictions. But it is also byzantine in
its design. This Part lays the foundation for Part III’s empirical analysis by
offering a brief overview of the FCA’s public–private hybrid structure and
summarizing anecdotal claims made about DOJ’s discharge of its statutory
oversight duties in particular.
A. Qui Tam Basics
Though enacted during the Civil War, the FCA’s modern incarnation
dates to 1986 when Congress, faced with rising concern about defenseprocurement fraud, passed strengthening amendments.46 Since then, the
43

See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
See Ben Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False Claims
Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135, 150–53 (2006) (offering a game-theoretic model of this dynamic).
45
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006).
46
See Beck, supra note 16, at 561–62 (recounting the FCA’s “1986 [r]evival”).
44
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FCA has quickly become the government’s chief weapon against fraud in
connection with federal programs and expenditures.47 Penalties are steep,
including civil penalties of $5500 to $11,000 for each “false claim” made
to the government as well as treble the amount of any proven fraud.48
While the FCA empowers the United States to bring enforcement
actions, the far more common mode of enforcement is private lawsuits
initiated under the FCA’s qui tam provisions.49 These provisions authorize
private persons, dubbed “relators,” to sue private parties alleging fraud
against the United States and earn a cash bounty equal to a portion—
ranging from 15% to 30%—of any recovery.50

47

CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 1.1 (2d ed.

2010).
48

§ 3729(a) (setting range of penalty amounts).
See id. § 3730 (setting forth FCA’s qui tam provisions); Fraud Statistics, supra note 15 (reporting
more than 600 qui tam suits in 2011 and 2012, but only 124 and 135 government-initiated “non qui tam”
new matters under the FCA for those same years).
50
See § 3730(b)–(d) (outlining relator rights and bounty shares).
49
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FIGURE 1: QUI TAM FILINGS BY CASE TYPE AND TOTAL RECOVERIES, 1987–2012

As shown in Figure 1, qui tam litigation has grown rapidly since the
FCA’s revival, rising from 30 lawsuits in 1987 to more than 600 per year in
2011 and 2012.51 Monetary recoveries have grown just as quickly, from
negligible amounts at the dawn of the regime to a whopping $3.4 billion in
2012, a sum that rivals or exceeds private litigation efforts in the antitrust
and securities areas.52 Rising recoveries have in turn attracted a dizzying
array of claims. The most common qui tam complaints assert fraud in
connection with federally funded health care services under Medicare and
Medicaid and defense procurement.53 Other types of claims include
underpayment of oil and gas royalties for extraction from federal lands as
well as myriad frauds in connection with federally insured education and
housing loans, federally funded research and construction projects,
Hurricane Katrina relief, and the Troubled Asset Relief Program.54

51
These numbers, and the data presented in Figure 1 more generally, are taken from DOJ’s most
recent figures on qui tam filings and recoveries, after adjustment for inflation. See Fraud Statistics,
supra note 15.
52
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
53
See Fraud Statistics, supra note 15 (reporting that roughly one-half to two-thirds of qui tam
filings over the past decade concern health care fraud).
54
For a comprehensive overview of claim types, see Common Types of Qui Tam Cases, PHILLIPS &
COHEN LLP, http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/Common-Types-of-Qui-Tam-Cases/ (last visited July
22, 2013).
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Not anyone can initiate a qui tam suit. The FCA contains several
provisions designed to minimize wasteful private enforcement efforts,
including: (i) a “first-to-file” provision precluding claims that mirror a
previously filed qui tam suit;55 (ii) a bar on claims related to an already
existing government enforcement proceeding;56 and (iii) a bar on claims
that were previously “publicly disclosed” except where the relator is an
“original source”—that is, has direct, firsthand knowledge—of the
information underlying the fraud claim.57 Together, these provisions are
designed, as the Supreme Court has noted, to achieve “the golden mean
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders . . . and
discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant
information to contribute of their own.”58
A final set of FCA provisions vests the Attorney General—and, by
further delegation, DOJ’s Civil Fraud Division—with substantial authority
55

See § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other than
the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending
action.”).
56
See id. § 3730(e)(3) (barring actions “based upon allegations or transactions which are the
subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is
already a party”).
57
For the currently operative language in the FCA regarding the public disclosure and original
source jurisdictional bars, see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)), which mandates that “[t]he
court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly
disclosed—(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its
agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report,
hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the action is brought by the
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” What
constitutes a “public disclosure” and an “original source” within the meaning of this provision (as well
as its predecessor version) has generated significant judicial debate. See, e.g., Schindler Elevator Corp.
v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2011) (holding that responses to a Freedom of
Information Act request, and the records attached thereto, constitute a “public disclosure” within the
FCA’s meaning); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 471, 475–76 (2007) (holding qui
tam relator must, to satisfy FCA’s “original source” requirement, possess sufficient firsthand
knowledge of information underlying fraud claim at time of filing complaint). Recent amendments
made in connection with the PPACA altered the regime in two ways. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. at 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). First, the PPACA added the above phrase “unless opposed by the Government,” thus depriving
defendants of the ability to independently challenge a relator’s claim on public disclosure or original
source grounds by vesting the government with what amounts to a right to veto a court’s dismissal on
such grounds. See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1250–51, 1251 n.18. Second, the PPACA clarified that a
relator may qualify as an original source if she “materially adds” to publicly disclosed allegations, thus
permitting relators to bring FCA claims with only secondhand information so long as they received that
information from sources separate from any public disclosure. See Elameto, supra note 16, at 821.
58
See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct.
1396, 1406 (2010) (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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to oversee and control qui tam litigation. For instance, DOJ may dismiss or
settle a qui tam case out from under a private relator, subject only to a basic
fairness hearing,59 or veto private dismissals or settlements.60 This latter
power is critically important: because a relator stands in the shoes of the
United States and sues on its behalf, any judgment will have preclusive
effect on the government’s later assertion of transactionally related claims,
creating incentives for relators and defendants to trade an unduly wide
release of liability for a larger settlement pot.61 Such concerns are
especially pronounced in qui tam cases litigated within the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which has held—contrary to all
other circuits to consider the issue—that DOJ does not possess an absolute
settlement veto unless it has previously intervened.62 I exploit the Ninth
Circuit’s unique holding in the empirical analysis to come.

59

See § 3730(c)(2)(B) (“The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding
the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the
proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”). Note that some
courts have interpreted DOJ’s termination and settlement authority as something less than absolute. The
Ninth Circuit, for instance, requires that DOJ show a “rational relation” between dismissal and a valid
government purpose. See United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151
F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A two step analysis applies here to test the justification for dismissal:
(1) identification of a valid government purpose; and (2) a rational relation between dismissal and
accomplishment of the purpose.” (quoting United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing
House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1341 (E.D. Cal. 1995))). However, this is a low bar, akin to arbitrary
and capricious review under the APA.
60
See § 3730(b)(1) (“The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give
written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”).
61
See, e.g., Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the
“danger that a relator can boost the value of settlement by bargaining away claims on behalf of the
United States”). DOJ’s settlement–veto authority is also important where a relator asserts both FCA and
other, often employment-related claims (e.g., wrongful termination) because of incentives to shift
settlement proceeds away from FCA fraud claims, where a relator receives only a portion of the
winnings under the FCA’s bounty provisions, and toward the other claims, where recovery is dollar-fordollar. Id. at 159 (noting the concern that a relator could “short-chang[e] the government by settling
both a False Claims Act suit and a private wrongful termination suit at the same time and shifting most
of the recovery into the wrongful termination settlement in order to reduce the percentage of the overall
amount that would ordinarily go to the government”).
62
See United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that DOJ may only seek to halt a private settlement by showing “good cause” where it has not
intervened previously). Other circuit courts have come out the other way. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Schweizer v. Océ N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that DOJ
dismissal or settlement authority is conditional on prior intervention); Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397
F.3d 925, 931 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Even where the Government has declined to intervene, relators are
required to obtain government approval prior to entering a settlement or voluntarily dismissing the
action.”); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
“a relator may not seek voluntary dismissal of any qui tam action without the Attorney General’s
consent”); Searcy, 117 F.3d at 158, 160 (finding “absolute veto power over voluntary settlements in qui
tam False Claims Act suits”). DOJ has publicly chafed at the Ninth Circuit’s restriction on its authority.
See False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4563 Before the Subcomm. on
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Perhaps the most significant form of oversight authority is DOJ’s
ability to intervene in qui tam suits.63 By statute, a qui tam relator files her
complaint with the court under seal, serving it only on the government.64 A
statutory sixty-day period (often subject to extensions65) follows, during
which DOJ investigates the allegations and decides whether to terminate or
settle the case out from under the relator, intervene and take “primary
responsibility” for the litigation of the case, or decline to intervene and
allow the relator to proceed alone.66 Importantly, the amount of the bounty
paid to a successful relator turns, at least in part, on DOJ’s case-election
decision: where DOJ declines intervention, a successful relator earns 25%
to 30% of any recovery; if DOJ intervenes, a relator keeps only 15% to
25%.67 During legislative debates leading up to the FCA’s 1986 revival,
this tiered system of payoffs was seen as essential to incentivize relators to
go it alone where a politicized bureaucracy refused to enforce.68

Admin. Law & Governmental Relations. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 29 (1992)
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
63
See § 3730(c)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action . . . . ”); id. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (authorizing the court to “impose
limitations on [a relator’s] participation” upon a government showing that “unrestricted participation
during the course of the litigation . . . would interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s
prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment”).
64
Id. § 3730(b)(2).
65
Id. § 3730(b)(3) (“The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of
the time during which the complaint remains under seal . . . . ”).
66
Id. § 3730(b)(2) (“The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60
days after it receives . . . the complaint . . . .”); id. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (authorizing the court to “impose
limitations on [a relator’s] participation” upon a government showing that “unrestricted participation
during the course of the litigation . . . would interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s
prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment”); id.
§ 3730(c)(1) (noting that government has “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action” where it
elects to intervene); id. § 3730(c)(3) (“If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”).
67
See id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
68
See Beck, supra note 16, at 563–64 (noting congressional concern during debate surrounding the
1986 amendments that “political considerations” led to “prosecutorial timidity” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
174 (1986) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (noting that because of institutional and practical
constraints, DOJ is unable to bring cases for every act of fraud and “qui tam offers a real potential . . . to
provide that prodding, that nudging, that will get the Justice Department into some of these areas”); id.
at 326 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (stating that “[p]essimism about the likelihood of
disclosures leading to results is not surprising” when one considers that more than 2000 fraud
investigations were completed in 1984, “[y]et the Justice Department successfully prosecuted in that
same year just 181 cases, including only one against one of the top 100 defense contractor[s]”); REP.
DANIEL GLICKMAN, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 22–23
(1986) (“[T]he Committee is concerned that there are instances in which the Government knew of the
information that was the basis of the qui tam suit, but in which the Government took no action.”); 132
CONG. REC. 22,340 (1986) (statement of Rep. Berkley Bedell) (“[I]n many cases, the authorities will
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B. The Puzzle of DOJ Oversight
Despite its finely wrought design, the FCA has generated enormous
controversy, with DOJ’s exercise of its oversight authority acting as a
particular lightning rod. Critics complain that DOJ too stingily deploys its
termination authority.69 And statements by DOJ officials suggest that DOJ,
at least in recent years, has had little inclination to put scarce public
enforcement resources toward dismissing meritless cases over other, more
affirmative enforcement efforts.70
DOJ’s intervention decisionmaking has also engendered controversy,
and for good reason. Among all of DOJ’s oversight powers, intervention
appears to have the most powerful systemic effect: DOJ statistics have long
suggested that intervened cases overwhelmingly generate recoveries while
declined cases overwhelmingly end in dismissal. One common
interpretation of this discrepancy is that DOJ selects cases on pure merits
grounds such that the residuum of unintervened cases can be presumed
meritless.71 Some federal courts—including the Fifth Circuit in a recent
not prosecute for political reasons . . . . [T]he Justice Department has neither the political will nor the
resources to always enforce all of the laws.”).
69
See Matthew, supra note 16, at 301; Rich, supra note 16, at 1236. Only a few published opinions
involve DOJ’s invocation of its termination authority. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange
Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1346, 1354 (E.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d, 151 F.3d
1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting DOJ motion to dismiss where the Government argued that continuation
of the qui tam action would thwart implementation of key USDA policies related to the preservation
and promotion of the citrus industry); United States v. Fiske, 968 F. Supp. 1347, 1354–55 (E.D. Ark.
1997) (“[T]he Government’s proffered reason for urging dismissal—that the allegations are without
merit—is a legitimate governmental reason and that dismissal is rationally related to the Government’s
desire to clear from the Court docket a meritless claim.”).
70
See False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 56 (statement of Michael F. Hertz,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (“We do not routinely devote
the additional resources that would be needed to determine that a qui tam action is frivolous or to move
to dismiss on those grounds.”); see also id. at 41 (letter from John T. Boese to Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(noting that “once the DOJ has decided not to intervene in a particular case, its commitment of
resources to that case going forward is quite limited” and that there is “little incentive” for DOJ to stop
a case “given the possibility, however remote, of some return on the Government’s limited ‘investment’
in the case once the DOJ has declined to intervene”). Even so, DOJ occasionally exercises its authority
to dismiss cases. See, e.g., Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding
DOJ decision to dismiss relator claim to be unreviewable).
71
See, e.g., Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 975 tbl.2 (2007) (reporting data showing that 92% of
cases where the U.S. declined to intervene and 73% of all qui tam actions were dismissed and noting
that such a high rate of dismissal suggests a large number of qui tam actions are meritless); Elameto,
supra note 16 (“The immense disparity between recoveries in qui tam actions in which the Government
intervened and those in which it did not suggests that most qui tam actions brought without government
intervention assert meritless or frivolous claims.”); Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers:
Hearing on H.R. 1788 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2, 12–13 (2009) (statement
of Marcia G. Madsen, Chamber of Commerce and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (noting
“[t]he inescapable data regarding the low success rate of non-intervened qui tam cases” and concluding
that “[w]hile the FCA—when deployed by the Government—has been effective in targeting fraud, the
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opinion—appear to take this view as well.72 On this account DOJ is,
invoking Part I’s stylized agency types, a welfare-maximizer engaged in
faithful and accurate merits signaling.
Others, however, question DOJ’s ability to gauge case merits and even
suggest that DOJ intervention decisions are wholly arbitrary, with some
relator counsel reporting that they can predict intervention based on which
line-level DOJ attorney is quarterbacking the case investigation.73 These
same voices further contend that the intervened–declined outcome
discrepancy stems from the litigation leverage DOJ involvement brings.
Some of this is simple optics: intervention ratchets up the negative
publicity of fraud allegations by denying defendants the ability to cast
litigation as the product of an overzealous and profit-driven private relator.
Another possibility is that DOJ intervention makes discovery more efficient
and thorough because DOJ attorneys can work directly with officials at the
affected agency to identify and collect evidence.74 Finally, government
involvement brings with it a powerful remedial option—debarment from
further federal contracting, a corporate “death sentence” for many federal
contractors and health care organizations—that is unavailable to relators
litigating alone.75
use of qui tam actions to detect and deter fraud has not”). Similar statements come from DOJ officials
themselves. See, e.g., False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 193 (statement of Michael
F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (asserting that the
discrepancy in outcomes shows DOJ has been “appropriately judicious in its review of qui tam matters
and has been highly successful in intervening in those cases that have true merit.” (emphasis added)).
72
See supra note 17.
73
See, e.g., Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Palo
Alto, Cal. (June 13, 2012).
74
DOJ attorneys can work internally with relevant agency officials to identify evidence pertaining
to the alleged false claims. They can also tap law enforcement agents at the FBI and Office of the
Inspector General to assist with any additional investigatory efforts. By contrast, relators litigating
unintervened cases can obtain evidence only through blind formal discovery requests. See False Claims
Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 102–03 (written statement of John T. Boese, Chamber of
Commerce and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (“Agency documents are particularly critical,
since the agency’s interpretation of a regulation or contract or grant term is essential to determining
whether a particular claim or statement is ‘false’ and to calculating the amount of damages suffered by
the Government.”). Importantly, there is evidence that DOJ does not necessarily share the fruits of its
investigation with private relators. See Bradford A. Penney, Help Citizens Help Government,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 5, 1990, at 18 (“If the Justice Department elects not to intervene, the
task of the relator in carrying forward with the case is a difficult one. The department typically resists
handing over investigative files, requiring the relator to duplicate the department’s investigation without
the government’s subpoena power and other investigative tools.”).
75
See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Note that the opposite logic seems possible as well:
certain top defense contractors might be too large and too important to the provision of military
hardware to debar from future contracting. See False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at
32 (testimony of Tina M. Gonter) (noting, regarding a case that DOJ had declined to intervene in, that
“there are only, you know, a few shipbuilders, you know, yards that actually can build submarines”); id.
at 36 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (contending that government was reluctant to pursue a defense
contractor accused of fraud “due to their future contracts with the Government”); Improved Efforts to
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If DOJ intervention drives case outcomes separate and apart from pure
case merit, then a natural question arises as to what mix of factors motivate
DOJ intervention decisions in the first place. A standard view is that DOJ
bases decisions on a simple risk–return calculus focused on case merits,
likely recovery size, and agency resource constraints.76 According to some,
resource constraints were especially acute in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks when government investigatory resources were diverted to
counterterrorism efforts.77 Other proffered theories resemble Part I’s ideal
welfare-maximizer agency: commentators suggest that DOJ is less likely to
intervene where relator and relator’s counsel are perceived to have
sufficient competence and resources to fully prosecute the action.78
Remaining views are less charitable. Some critics cast DOJ as a
politicker agency that pursues outsized recoveries it can tout as proof of
agency prowess, extracting unfair settlements79 or joining cases, often
belatedly, even where private enforcers are fully capable of vindicating
government interests.80 A further charge is that politics drives intervention
decisions. Thus, a sitting United States Senator has openly accused DOJ of
declining or sitting on politically-charged qui tam cases, particularly
defense-procurement fraud cases related to controversial military ventures
in Iraq and Afghanistan during the administration of President George W.
Bush (Bush43).81 And a top DOJ official in the Obama administration has
Combat Health Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
112th Cong. 33 (2011) (testimony of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services) (“[S]ome major pharmaceutical corporations that have been
convicted of crimes and paid hundreds of millions of dollars in False Claims Act settlements continue
to participate in the Federal health care programs, in part because of the potential patient harm that
could result from an exclusion.”).
76
See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice’s
Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409, 439
(1993); WEST, supra note 17.
77
See Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act:
“Outsourcing” the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal Period,
83 N.D. L. REV. 837, 852 (2007).
78
See Kolis, supra note 76, at 438; WEST, supra note 17.
79
See, e.g., Channing Turner, Amid Health Care Fraud and Abuse Crackdown, Lawyers Call for
Reassessment, MAIN JUSTICE (July 14, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/07/14/
amid-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-crackdown-industry-lawyers-call-for-reassessment/ (noting position
of top qui tam defense lawyers that FCA enforcement “has created a disconnect between enforcement
efforts and the goal of encouraging compliance” because investigators “are pressured to seek greater
and greater settlements instead of helping companies understand the statute’s complexities”).
80
See Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 9, 2011) (noting concern among relator’s bar that DOJ often intervenes on eve of settlement,
thus reducing the bounty share in cases litigated mostly or entirely by the relator). Cf. Kolis, supra note
76, at 453 (noting that some relators resist DOJ intervention).
81
See supra note 19; False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19 (statement of Sen. Patrick
J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (decrying the “politicization of the Justice
Department” and asking if DOJ has “resisted pursuing certain false claims cases for political reasons—
most notably those involving contracting fraud related to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan”); see also
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likewise implied a lack of prosecutorial vigor by his Bush43 predecessors
in defense-procurement cases in particular.82
Still others assert that what matters most is not the merit of the fraud
claim but its object. Nearly all qui tam cases allege fraud not on DOJ itself,
but rather on some other federal agency. This is important, as, in the civil
context, DOJ traditionally treats its relationship with such agencies as that
of attorney and client and so is unlikely to pursue a claim without the
primary agency’s support.83 Many declinations, DOJ critics assert, thus
come from DOJ yielding to its client’s (i.e., the primary agency’s) desire to
cover up lax oversight or other mistakes.84 They further maintain that
personnel at certain agencies—among them the Departments of Defense
and the Interior—resist government involvement in qui tam suits because
of ignorance of the qui tam regime or because a revolving door with
industry yields an agency leadership and organizational culture resistant to
whistleblowing.85
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DOJ OVERSIGHT IN QUI TAM CASES
This Part moves beyond anecdote by offering an empirical analysis of
DOJ’s discharge of its oversight duties under the FCA. Deploying multiple
identification strategies, I offer preliminary evidence on three types of
questions raised above. First, which of Part I’s stylized agency types, if
any, best fits DOJ’s oversight efforts? In particular, to what extent does
DOJ terminate cases, leverage deficient private enforcement efforts, or
intervene in order to police collusive settlements? Second, do DOJ
intervention decisions appear merits-based, or do political or other
“strategic” considerations also seem to drive DOJ intervention
decisionmaking? And finally, can the sharp discrepancy in outcomes
between intervened and unintervened cases be ascribed to DOJ’s meritsscreening capacity, or is it primarily an artifact of DOJ’s potent litigation
leverage? In other words, and as framed previously, to what extent is DOJ a
merits screener or a merits maker?

Mark Thompson, Stealth Law: Whistleblowers and Their Lawyers Are Maneuvering to Cash in on
Military Fraud, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 33, 36 (noting belief by one qui tam lawyer that officials in a
“military-minded” administration “have every interest in seeing whistleblower lawsuits fail”).
82
See Civil Division, supra note 19. In addition, a former federal prosecutor reported during an
interview that he repeatedly watched his “career pass before [his] eyes” while working a qui tam case
against Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root relating to Iraq war contracting because of
heightened oversight by Main Justice. See Telephone Interview with Former Assistant U.S. Attorney,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 11, 2011).
83
See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of
Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 562 (2003).
84
See, e.g., Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in
Washington, D.C. (June 13, 2012).
85
Id.
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A. Data
In an effort to answer these questions, I collected unique data from two
sources. First, I obtained a list of the more than 4000 unsealed qui tam
lawsuits filed since 1986 along with certain case-level information via
Freedom of Information Act requests served on DOJ.86 Second, I retrieved
electronic docket sheets for the same set of cases and merged information
from them with DOJ-provided data.87 The result is complete case
information, including litigation dates, recoveries and relator shares, and
party and counsel information for roughly 4000 qui tam cases over the
period 1986–2011. Third, I supplemented this data by drawing a random
sample of 500 cases and constructing a hand-coded dataset with a more
fine-grained accounting of case characteristics for the 460 cases for which
case file materials could be obtained.88 Finally, I conducted two dozen
interviews with plaintiff- and defense-side qui tam lawyers and present and
past officials and attorneys at DOJ’s Civil Fraud section and regional U.S.
Attorneys’ offices to gain a more textured understanding of the regime.
B. Descriptive Evidence on DOJ Gatekeeping
An initial set of inferences can be drawn regarding the extent to which
DOJ oversight deviates from Part I’s gatekeeper ideal via a range of
descriptive evidence. To that end, this Section sets forth evidence
regarding: (i) the frequency with which DOJ invokes its authority to
terminate cases; (ii) DOJ’s use of its intervention authority, including its
overall intervention rate and its success rate in intervened cases relative to
86
Roughly 3000 qui tam suits remain under seal and likely fall into one of three categories. First, a
substantial portion of the 3000 cases were filed in the past five years and remain under seal pending the
completion of DOJ investigations. Second, a very small fraction of the 3000 cases are closed cases
subject to various privileges, including the state secrets privilege, perhaps because the case implicates
national security concerns. According to present and former DOJ attorneys, the rest of the 3000 cases
are likely closed cases that remained sealed for a variety of reasons, including neglect by the judge to
unseal the case, accidental failure by the relevant DOJ attorney to request unsealing upon case
termination, or a successful relator effort to persuade the trial judge to keep the case sealed, typically
because he or she remains employed by the company named in the suit. Some interviewees suggested
that the latter type of case is likely to be concentrated in the time period prior to 2000 or 2001, when
DOJ, under pressure from congressional overseers, changed policy and began to take a more aggressive
stance in advocating unsealing of any terminated case. See Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 9, 2011); Interview with Relator Counsel, in
S.F., Cal. (Oct. 7, 2010). Before that, the interviewees suggested, the likelihood that a case would
remain sealed likely reflected the idiosyncratic approaches of U.S. Attorney offices as opposed to
particular case attributes. See id. In sum, my sample is likely unrepresentative in at least two respects,
containing more interventions than the full qui tam case population since 1986, and also more cases
brought by current, as opposed to former, company employees.
87
I used a PERL programming script to “scrape” information from particular fields on each docket
sheet, including litigation dates and party and counsel names, and place it in an Excel spreadsheet.
88
The forty cases for which case file materials could not be obtained were dropped from the
sample, raising the possibility of some minor sampling bias.
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unintervened ones, both across presidential administrations and case types;
(iii) the timing of DOJ settlements; and (iv) the distribution of recoveries
and recovery amounts.
1. DOJ’s Use of Its Termination Authority.—A clear finding that
emerges from the data is that DOJ rarely invokes its authority under the
FCA to terminate qui tam cases. Indeed, analysis of the 460-case
subsample of qui tam cases revealed exactly none in which DOJ exercised
its termination authority. Applying standard principles of sampling error,
this implies that DOJ invokes its termination authority in no more than
roughly 4% of qui tam cases and likely far less than that.89 One
interpretation is that DOJ is unconcerned with screening meritless cases or
has concluded that doing so does not warrant expenditure of scarce public
enforcement resources over other uses, such as affirmative enforcement
efforts. This would confirm Part I’s theoretical prediction.90 It is also
possible, however, that DOJ achieves the same ends in other, informal
ways. For instance, DOJ might achieve case termination by privately
conveying its disinterest in a case to relators, inducing them to dismiss
cases prior to a DOJ case-election decision. DOJ terms such an outcome a
“pre-election dismissal,” and former DOJ officials and attorneys confirmed
that such dismissals nearly always come after DOJ has conveyed its
intention to decline intervention.91 However, such cases appear to be
limited in number: out of roughly 4000 cases, DOJ’s internal records
assigned the “Dismissed Pre-Election” label to only 312 total cases.
A second possibility is that DOJ sees no need to invoke its termination
authority because it can induce “voluntary” dismissals by relators via
intervention decisions by simply declining cases. The data offer at least
89
I also attempted a rough assessment of the frequency of DOJ’s invocation of its termination
authority by conducting electronic searches on case docket sheets across the full 4000-plus-case dataset
of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the FCA statutory provision authorizing DOJ termination. Doing so
identified only 30 cases across the study period in which DOJ exercised its authority to dismiss cases
out from under private relators. Nearly all of these dismissals, moreover, were based on DOJ’s
determination that a relator’s claim was jurisdictionally barred, typically on “public disclosure,”
“original source,” or “first-to-file” grounds, or because of national security concerns relating to
disclosure of classified information, and not a judgment about underlying case merits. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 2009 WL 911037, at *1, *6 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2009) (dismissing
case upon government motion urging lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a result of FCA’s first-to-file
bar); United States ex rel. Fay v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2008 WL 877180, at *1, *10 (D. Colo.
Mar. 27, 2008) (granting dismissal upon government motion on basis of disclosure of classified
information relating to national security).
90
This should perhaps not come as a surprise: as noted previously, a top DOJ official recently
testified before a congressional committee that lawyers under his direction do not direct scarce
resources toward assessing case merits and weighing termination once DOJ has determined not to
intervene. See supra note 70. My findings suggest that this has been true throughout the life of the post1986 regime.
91
See, e.g., Interview with Former Assistant Dir., Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011).
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some evidence of this: in the 460-case subsample, roughly 60% of cases in
which DOJ declined intervention appeared to generate no further litigation
prior to a voluntary dismissal by the relator. This, however, leaves 40% of
cases in which DOJ declined intervention that did in fact generate
postdeclination litigation prior to dismissal by the relator, making this a
questionable strategy from a pure efficiency standpoint.
2. DOJ’s Use of Its Intervention Authority.—Figures 2 and 3 use the
data to explore DOJ’s exercise of its intervention authority. Figure 2 tracks
DOJ interventions and declinations over the period 1986–2011, reporting
annual intervention and declination tallies (the top stack), and intervention
rates, both overall and across case types (the bottom stack).92

92
Several points warrant mention regarding my coding of the data. The first two concern my
coding of interventions and declinations, both here and in the regression analysis to come. First, I treat
the small number of pre-election dismissals in my sample that lack an FCA recovery as declinations, in
keeping with assurances from former DOJ attorneys, as just discussed, that such dismissals invariably
result from DOJ’s signaling of its intention to decline intervention. A publicly available memo from the
United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania offers further grounds for doing
so. See Memorandum from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. Pa., False Claims Act Cases:
Government Intervention in Qui Tam (Whistleblower) Suits 2 [hereinafter Eastern District Memo],
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Documents/fcaprocess2.pdf (noting that DOJ will
sometimes “advise the relator that the Department of Justice intends to decline intervention” and that
“[t]his usually, but not always, results in dismissal of the qui tam action”). Further confirmation of the
propriety of my approach is found in relators’ motions for voluntary pre-election dismissal referencing
an unofficial indication that DOJ will decline to intervene. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss of Globe
Composite Solutions, Ltd. at 1–2, United States ex rel. Globe Composite Solutions v. Solar Constr.,
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Mass. 2007) (No. 1:05-cv-10004-JLT) (“As of the date of the filing of this
motion, the relator has received no official notice from the United States as to whether it intends to
intervene. However, all ‘unofficial’ indications have been that the United States intends to decline, and
that a declination letter has been drafted and has been under review at the Department of Justice since
May of this year.”). As a final validity check, a former DOJ attorney suggested during an interview that
a unilateral relator decision to dismiss prior to DOJ’s election decision is a very unusual and rare event.
See Interview with Former Assistant Dir., Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011). This is especially true because even pre-election dismissals will typically result in
the unsealing of the case. Thus, a relator who is reconsidering her filing decision may not be able to
reliably protect her identity upon a pre-election dismissal, creating large incentives to continue with her
claim once filed. See Kathleen McDermott, Qui Tam: An AUSA’s Perspective, TAXPAYERS AGAINST
FRAUD Q. REV., Oct. 1997, at 23 (“[E]ven after the government declines to intervene and the relator
determines not to proceed there is a danger that the public record will reveal the filing of suit that both
the relator and the United States declined to pursue.”). Second, I coded the few pre-election dismissals
in cases that generated a FCA recovery as interventions. Former DOJ attorneys uniformly agreed that
these are cases in which DOJ negotiated a rapid settlement of the FCA claim after investigation,
obviating the need for a formal intervention decision that was otherwise all but certain. See Interview
with Former Assistant Dir., Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10,
2011); Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, D.C.
(June 13, 2012); see also Eastern District Memo, supra, at 2 (noting that DOJ may “settle the pending
qui tam action with the defendant prior to the intervention decision”).
A second coding note concerns my effort to control for the possibility that relators in
multidefendant actions can choose between filing numerous serial suits or a single omnibus suit. As
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FIGURE 2: DOJ INTERVENTION TALLIES AND RATES IN QUI TAM CASES, 1986–2011

At least two broad conclusions can be drawn. First, DOJ intervenes
approximately one-quarter of the time, with relatively higher intervention
rates in health and defense cases and relatively lower intervention rates in
“other” case types. Yet there is also considerable variability: even after the
qui tam regime reached maturity in the mid- to late-1990s, intervention
rates have ranged from as low as 18% (in 1999 and 2007) to as high as
34% (in 2000), with similar peaks and valleys within case types—e.g.,
health cases in 2000 (high) and 2007 (low); defense cases in 2004 (high)
and 2011 (low); “other” cases in 2005 (high) and 1999 (low). Some of
described in more detail in prior empirical work, see Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1290–91, I have
minimized the resulting measurement concerns by collapsing together and treating as a single “action”
any suits with a common relator or relator law firm and at least two common litigation dates (filing
date, DOJ case-election date, or settlement/termination date).

1719

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

these differences, of course, may simply reflect sample-size limitations, but
the overall pattern is still striking.
A second broad observation is that the data offer little facial support for
the notion, advanced by some critics, that DOJ intervention decisions have
had a partisan political cast over time.93 Rather, intervention rates appear
similarly variable within and across presidential administrations. Perhaps
most important of all in this regard, Figure 2 seems, on its face at least, to
contradict the claim that the Bush43 Administration was less interventionist
in defense-procurement cases in particular. Indeed, intervention rates in
defense cases reached their peak (at 43%) in 2004, when George W. Bush
was well into his presidency. I return to this issue in Part III.D and use
more sophisticated statistical techniques to interrogate the data.
Figure 3 shifts away from intervention rates and turns to the impact of
DOJ intervention on qui tam litigation outcomes. The top stack shows that
intervened cases have generated recoveries a whopping 90% of the time,
with declined cases failing to achieve recoveries at the same overwhelming
rate. This state of affairs has remained steady since 1986. This is consistent
with the more anecdotal claims made about DOJ oversight.

93

See supra notes 19, 81–82 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 3: DOJ RECOVERY RATES AND MEAN AND MEDIAN DOLLAR AMOUNTS BY
INTERVENTION STATUS IN QUI TAM CASES, 1986–2011
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The bottom two stacks enrich the story by tracing the impact of DOJ
intervention decisions on recovery dollar amounts rather than success rates.
The second (middle) stack reports mean and median recoveries by
intervened or declined status in all cases, whether the case ultimately
produced a recovery (i.e., returned funds to the federal fisc) or not. The
third (bottom) stack examines those same trends constraining the sample to
only those cases that produced a recovery.94 Interestingly, while the gap
between win rates in intervened and declined cases has remained wide and
steady, the gap between the average recovery in successful intervened and
declined cases has not. Rather, recoveries in intervened cases have risen
steadily over the life of the regime, with mean recoveries in declined cases
showing a more recent increase, driven by a handful of large wins in cases
DOJ declined.95 Even so, examining the data as a whole and focusing on
recovery dollars rather than success rates, the centrality of DOJ
intervention is hard to ignore: between 1986 and 2011, intervened cases
generated roughly $24 billion in recoveries, or 94% of the total recovery,
while declined cases generated only $1.5 billion in recoveries, or 6%.
3. The Timing of DOJ Settlements.—We might also draw inferences
about DOJ decisionmaking by considering the timing of recoveries. An
important assumption of Part I’s theoretical analysis is that an agency
vested with gatekeeper authority akin to DOJ’s powers under the FCA will
use those powers in politically conscious ways, seeking to maximize
certain outcomes—total wins, total dollars recovered—over other, less
politically salient measures.96 It follows that we might also expect to see
patterns in the timing of case outcomes, as a politically conscious agency
seeks to bring home successful cases prior to the end of a measurement
period. This might be especially true in the FCA context because of DOJ’s
continuing practice of holding a press conference and issuing a press
release soon after the conclusion of the government fiscal year on
September 30 announcing the agency’s annual FCA take.97

94

This does not include cases that produced a damages recovery via a claim for retaliation under
the FCA’s anti-retaliation provisions.
95
See, e.g., United States & State of Illinois ex rel. Mason v. Medline Indus., Inc., No. 07-cv05615 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 4, 2007) (recovery of $85 million in 2011 in unintervened case); United
States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., No. 07-cv-00960 (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 21, 2007) (recovery of $57.7
million in 2010 in unintervened case); United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, No. 03-cv0457 (E.D. Cal. filed Mar. 7, 2003) (recovery of $67.5 million in 2009 in unintervened case). Note that
the listed settlement amounts for each of these cases are, as with the other empirical findings reported
herein, drawn from my dataset as constructed from information reported by DOJ pursuant to my FOIA
requests and the cases’ electronic docket sheets. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
96
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
97
See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $5 Billion in False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
December/12-ag-1439.html (announcing “the largest annual recovery in the Department’s history”);
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in
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FIGURE 4: TOTAL RECOVERY COUNTS AND DOLLARS BY CALENDAR QUARTER IN QUI TAM
CASES, 1986–2011

Figure 4 reports total qui tam recovery counts and dollars by calendaryear quarter across the life of the post-1986 FCA regime. As expected,
recovery counts and amounts have spiked substantially in Q3, the end of
the federal government’s fiscal year. This strongly suggests (but does not
prove) that DOJ rushes to conclude settlements—perhaps even altering its
settlement calculus—to “book” recoveries prior to the end of the
government fiscal year. Harder to explain under this theory is the roughly
comparable Q4 spike in recovery amounts. One possibility is that DOJ
lawyers endeavor to close out cases before the fiscal year’s end but fail to
do so, with the result that many recoveries spill over into Q4.98 Another
possibility is that corporate defendants, not DOJ, are more receptive to
settlements in Q4 as the tax year draws to a close.99 Either of these
dynamics offers a plausible explanation for why Q4 also shows a
pronounced uptick in recovery amounts relative to the other two quarters.

Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ1665.html (announcing that DOJ had set “[r]ecords for [r]ecoveries” in 2011).
98
A useful analogy comes from the tax context: one former enforcement official at the Internal
Revenue Service noted that May of each year was euphemistically referred to within the Service as
“May Madness” as agents hurried to reach provisional agreement on settlement terms so that they could
secure the necessary authorization up the agency management chain in time for September closure. But
the resulting logjam during the final months of the government fiscal year meant that some agents could
not obtain sign off in time. See Telephone Interview with former IRS Div. Comm’r, Internal Revenue
Serv. (Sept. 12, 2012).
99
The same IRS enforcement official noted above, however, suggested that this may be a
secondary factor. Perhaps more important are reporting requirements in connection with end-of-year
financial filings. Once settlement negotiations have begun, public and even private companies assume
reporting obligations regarding “contingent liabilities.” This can also constrain stock trading and other
strategic moves by the company. For these and other reasons, a defendant company might have strong
incentives to simply settle a matter in advance of year-end regulatory and shareholder filings. Id.
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4. The Distribution of Qui Tam Recoveries.—A final descriptive
view seeks to draw inferences about DOJ’s intervention calculus by
expanding on earlier work by Kwok examining recovery patterns across
intervened and declined qui tam cases.100 It is a plausible assumption that
the fraud perpetrated on the government—and, in turn, DOJ intervention
decisions based on objective case “merit”—would produce a frequency
distribution of recoveries that resembles a normal or log-normal curve, with
relatively larger numbers of recoveries taking middling values and
relatively smaller numbers of recoveries taking higher or lower values. By
contrast, strategic DOJ action might generate deviations from normality. If,
for instance, DOJ adopts a strategy of systematically leveraging lower
value cases, then qui tam recoveries in intervened cases will exhibit a
“humped” distribution at lower recovery values. Similarly, a politicker
agency—invoking Part I’s stylized agency types—might generate a skew
toward relatively larger recoveries as the agency seeks out marquee
enforcement opportunities. Finally, DOJ pursuit of a combined politicker
and merits-maximizer strategy—that is, an agency that seeks to pad its
recovery total by cherry-picking larger, marquee cases while at the same
time bolstering its win–loss record by taking up a stream of relatively
smaller, easier-to-win cases—might yield a bimodal, “double-humped”
distribution in which relatively higher and lower value awards
predominate. In such a situation, recoveries in declined cases will occupy
more of a middle band of recovery value, since these cases pad neither
DOJ’s recovery total nor its win rate.
Kwok previously found no evidence of a “double-humped”
distribution from which to infer DOJ was actively leveraging smaller value
cases.101 However, any analysis of possible DOJ leveraging should also
take account of the strategic nature of interactions between DOJ, relators,
and relator counsel. As noted previously, relators and their counsel may not
have sufficient incentive to bring lower value cases except where DOJ can
credibly commit to playing a leveraging role.102 Indeed, without DOJ
intervention—and, more importantly, the possible boost in the probability
of a recovery that goes along with it—relators and their counsel may not
surface certain cases at all. But, as noted previously, DOJ efforts to signal
such commitment will suffer from a basic exchange problem, since DOJ
cannot perfectly assure relators it will not renege and engage in ex post
opportunism.103 One implication is that repeat players within the system
should be better positioned to overcome such problems.104 A further
100

See Kwok, supra note 30.
See id. at 12–14.
102
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
103
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
104
See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress;
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 141–42 (1988).
101
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implication is that, to the extent DOJ seeks to leverage small-value claims,
we should see the greatest evidence of it with respect to cases brought by
repeat players within the regime. We might also expect that a DOJ
leveraging role will only emerge over time as a cooperative, endogenous
equilibrium among DOJ, relators, and relator counsel is established.
Figure 5 presents histograms of logged recovery amounts (in 2011
dollars) in intervened and declined qui tam cases between 1986 and
2011.105 The first histogram in the top row presents frequencies of logged
recovery amounts for intervened and declined cases, respectively, in the
full sample. Successive histograms in the top row present the same analysis
subset by whether the case was brought by “Top Counsel,” defined as any
case brought by a firm with ten or more prior qui tam filings at the time of
DOJ’s election decision, or “Other Counsel,” defined as a firm with nine or
fewer prior filings. The remaining rows duplicate the top-row analysis,
constraining the sample to cases elected during the Clinton, Bush43, and
Obama Administrations, respectively.106

105
A histogram is a graphical method for displaying the shape of a distribution by breaking data
into intervals and reporting the frequency with which observations fall into each. Using a logarithmic
transformation is a common means of reducing the number of intervals, thus providing a more
meaningful visual representation.
106
I omit the first Bush (Bush41) Administration from the presentation because of the limited
number of cases during that time period.
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FIGURE 5: FREQUENCY OF LOGGED RECOVERY AMOUNTS IN INTERVENED AND DECLINED QUI
TAM CASES BY FULL SAMPLE, FIRM EXPERIENCE, AND PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AT
INTERVENTION, 1986–2011

The results offer critical perspective on DOJ’s intervention calculus.
First, in the sample as a whole, recoveries in intervened cases are
characterized by a modest rightward skew, with the right-hand tail plainly
longer than the left-hand tail.107 One interpretation is that this confirms a
weak DOJ preference for higher value cases. But a counter-interpretation is
possible as well: a shortened left-hand tail might also suggest a DOJ that is
eager to take relatively lower value cases—either because they will not
otherwise attract sufficient private enforcement or to pad its win rate—so
long as the expected return rises above a basic break-even threshold. Put
another way, low-value cases are likely to be lower bounded, while highvalue cases will not be upper bounded.

107

A distribution is “skewed” if one tail—that is, one end—extends out further than the other. Note
that, because Figure 5’s histograms are based on logarithmic transformations of recovery amounts, the
visual presentation will underrepresent the degree of rightward skew compared to a nonlogged
distribution by compressing recovery amounts at the higher end of case value.
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Whatever the interpretation on this point, the distribution of recoveries
in the sample as a whole plainly allows us to reject some of the more
overheated claims about DOJ’s intervention calculus. Indeed, to the extent
DOJ pursues high-value claims, it is not a dominant strategy, as DOJ
clearly pursues plenty of middle- and low-value claims as well. Note,
however, that this does not rule out the possibility that DOJ is nonetheless
acting as a politicker agency, intervening even where its presence in a case
adds little or no value.
The portrait grows more complicated, however, when the subsetted
results are considered. Indeed, the histograms reveal at least some double
humping of recovery frequencies, both in cases initiated by “Top Counsel”
in particular and during more recent time periods. Importantly, the spread
between humps is quite large: for “Top Counsel” cases in the full sample
(the first row, middle histogram), the two peaks in evidence represent
average recoveries of roughly $630,000 and $6.3 million, respectively,
leaving a nontrivial middle-value trough in between.108 Note, however, that
double humping is not confined to “Top Counsel,” particularly during the
Bush43 and Obama periods, as “Other Counsel” recoveries in these more
recent time periods likewise show at least some evidence of double
humping, complicating interpretation. On one hand, if we believe that only
more experienced counsel can solve the exchange problem that afflicts
initiation of lower value cases, then double humping in cases brought by
less experienced counsel tends to cut against the possibility that DOJ is
actively seeking to leverage lower value cases. And yet, it may simply be
the case that time, rather than counsel experience, is more important to the
emergence of a cooperative equilibrium in which private enforcers
confidently feed DOJ a supply of lower value cases.109
*

*

*

Taken together, the above descriptive results permit an initial set of
conclusions about DOJ’s discharge of its oversight duties and possible
deviations from Part I’s ideal gatekeeper role. First, the paucity of DOJ
termination efforts strongly suggests that DOJ is not playing a pure
welfare-maximizer role—or, at the least, views its main responsibilities

108
I obtained these numbers by undoing the logarithmic transformation at 5.8 and 6.8, respectively.
One way to gauge the significance of the double humping in evidence in the “Top Counsel” portion of
the “Full Sample” analysis is to use a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to compare its distribution to the
distribution in the “Other Counsel” portion of the “Full Sample” analysis to its immediate right. Doing
so finds a highly significant result (p = 0.000), implying that there exists a difference between the two
distributions that cannot be explained by chance.
109
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (noting ways that DOJ and private enforcers
might overcome their exchange problem).
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otherwise. Part IV’s discussion returns to this issue and discusses ways
policymakers might alter DOJ incentives in that regard.
A similar, though more tentative, conclusion follows from the
distribution of recoveries across intervened and declined qui tam cases. In
particular, the dearth of recoveries in declined cases and the lack of “double
humping” in the histogram analysis together suggest that DOJ, in making
intervention decisions, does not prioritize leveraging overmatched relator
counsel or inviting and pursuing lower value claims. To be sure, this does
not preclude the possibility that DOJ is playing a welfare-maximizer role.
For instance, it remains possible that DOJ intervenes in all cases with a
threshold level of merit but then allocates very different amounts of
resources to cases postintervention, thus effectively delegating greater
amounts of enforcement authority to fully competent enforcers as a way to
conserve resources for other cases.110 But because so few declined cases
yield recoveries, it will be difficult to observe such efforts empirically.
As a final note, while the histograms defy definitive interpretation, the
analysis nonetheless highlights some of the difficult trade-offs implicit in
available DOJ intervention strategies. A resource-constrained DOJ that
systematically makes intervention decisions with an eye to leveraging
smaller value claims will give up recovery value—likely middle-value
cases—in so doing. Thus, if the current DOJ de-emphasized cases falling at
or near the lower value hump in evidence in Figure 5 and shifted its efforts
to declined cases that occupy the more middling range of recovery value,
the overall result might be greater total recoveries. To that extent,
leveraging may, at least from the perspective of a rent-seeker agency, come
at a substantial cost.
C. “Strategic” Correlates of DOJ Intervention:
Logistic Regression Analysis
Further progress in understanding DOJ’s gatekeeper activities requires
a push beyond simple descriptive statistics. To explore more fully possible
correlates of DOJ intervention decisions in particular, I next specify a logit
model, with the case as the unit of analysis, of the following form:
Pr |yi = 1| = 1/(1 + exp(-(α + β1X11 + β2Y2 . . . βkZk)))
110
To that extent, a Florida district court’s 2001 decision reveals what may be a pattern: DOJ
reportedly “sought and received assurances from [relator’s] counsel of their ability and willingness to
commit the necessary resources to the case and to undertake the principal role in prosecuting the
litigation.” United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329
(M.D. Fla. 2001). Interviews with top relator counsel likewise established that DOJ has in the past
conditioned intervention on a relator firm’s willingness to commit to provide an itemized list of
litigation resources to the effort, including a defined number of private lawyers (requiring the firm to
associate with other firms) as well as experts and computer equipment necessary to analyze large
amounts of data. Interview with Relator Counsel, in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 7, 2010).
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where y represents the probability of winning DOJ intervention and X, Y,
and Z represent independent variables of interest.
Existing theory and evidence suggest a number of variables that will be
important determinants of DOJ intervention or are logically necessary
control variables. The Appendix presents descriptive statistics for these
variables as well as those used in the separate regression analysis in Part
III.D.
An initial pair of variables explores the impact of resource constraints
on DOJ decisionmaking.111 I first constructed a measure,
DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT, equal to the number of active, intervened qui
tam cases divided by the number of attorneys at DOJ’s Civil Fraud section
during the year of each intervention decision in each sample case.112 My
expectation is that DOJ will be less likely to intervene in cases as resource
constraints rise and vice versa. In addition, and as noted previously, some
have suggested that the 9/11 terrorist attacks redirected substantial civil
investigatory resources previously available to DOJ to counterterrorism
efforts.113 To test for a resource-based effect on DOJ decisionmaking in
9/11’s aftermath, I constructed a measure, 911RESOURCECONSTRAINT,
equal to 730 minus the number of days after September 11, 2001, that DOJ
rendered an election decision for two years following the attacks.114 The
result is a measure running from zero to 730, with cases elected
immediately following September 11, 2001, taking the highest value and
111
It is relatively uncontroversial that resource constraints affect agency enforcement action. See,
e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 22, at 757–60 (reviewing literature linking SEC resource limitations to
a more selective enforcement strategy and slower agency action). For commentary on the effect of
resource constraints on DOJ intervention decisionmaking in particular, see supra notes 76–78 and
accompanying text.
112
Attorney counts were constructed using congressional testimony characterizing the number of
Civil Fraud attorneys in a given year as well as historical office phone lists provided by former Civil
Fraud attorneys, with missing years then filled in via linear interpolation. Note further that, while my
case-level data allow me to precisely track the total number of intervened cases at any point in time, I
can only imperfectly observe the extent to which DOJ lawyers are actively litigating open cases. In
complex litigation, cases often lay fallow for long stretches of time, flaring up around bouts of
discovery (e.g., document review, depositions) and motion practice, with only the latter reflected on
docket sheets. Regardless, my construction of the variable assumes that DOJ officials understand and
take account of litigation’s cadence when deciding whether to intervene in the marginal case. All else
equal, a DOJ that is litigating more intervened cases is more resource constrained than one litigating
fewer.
113
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
114
Alternative specifications of this variable include a simple dummy variable taking a value of one
during the year following the attacks or a logarithmic transformation of the number of days after 9/11 to
reflect more substantial resource constraints in the period immediately following the attacks, with the
effect diminishing over time. In addition, one could employ different assumptions about the duration of
post-9/11 resource constraints, thus constructing a variable pegged to, say, 365 days (assuming the
resource constraints lasted one year) or 1095 days (three years). None of these variants yielded a
materially different result in the models reported below.
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reflecting relatively greater 9/11-related resource constraints, cases elected
two years later, on September 11, 2003, taking the lowest value and
reflecting relatively lower post-9/11 resource constraints, and cases before
or after the two-year window taking a value of zero. The expectation is that
this variable will negatively predict intervention, as resource scarcity
compelled DOJ to concentrate its investigatory and litigation efforts on a
smaller set of cases following the attacks.
A second set of variables follows other research exploring the
relationship of repeat play among qui tam enforcers and DOJ intervention
decisions, with more experienced (repeat) relators being relatively less
likely to win DOJ intervention and more experienced counsel relatively
more likely to do so.115 EXPERIENCEDRELATOR is a simple indicator
variable set to one if the relator in question has filed at least one prior case.
TOPRELATORFIRM and MIDRELATORFIRM are also indicator variables, set
to one in any case in which the most experienced firm providing relatorside representation had previously filed ten or more or between one and
nine prior cases, respectively. In the regression models, “one-shotter”
counsel thus serve as the baseline category.
Empirical studies of regulatory enforcement have found that
government enforcement officials are less likely to file enforcement actions
against larger companies, perhaps because such companies have greater
political clout or resources to put toward legal defense.116 Either possibility
could impact the risk–return calculus of a strategic DOJ or primary agency.
Accordingly, I created an indicator variable, FORTUNE100, denoting cases
in which at least one defendant in the action is listed among Fortune 100
companies during one or more years of the study period.117 I also created an
indicator variable, DEFENSE50, denoting cases brought against firms
reported by the Department of Defense in one or more years of the study
period as one of the top fifty recipients of defense-procurement dollars. A
DOJ focused on maximizing recovery dollars or win rates might shy away
from cases involving either type of defendant not only because of their
relative size but also because they might be thought too important to debar

115

See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1289, 1299, 1313.
See, e.g., Gadinis, supra note 39, at 682–83 (summarizing findings that larger Wall Street firms
and their employees fared better in SEC enforcement actions along multiple dimensions, including the
severity of sanctions sought and imposed and the likelihood that individual employees as opposed to the
firm as an entity would be subject to regulatory action); Wayne B. Gray & Mary E. Deily, Compliance
and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 96,
108, 110 (1996) (finding evidence that the Environmental Protection Agency was less likely to bring
pollution-related enforcement actions against larger steel companies); Rajabiun, supra note 38 (noting
possible public enforcer preference for actions against “firms less likely to be able to defend
themselves”).
117
Prior to the mid-1990s, Fortune maintained separate lists for manufacturing and service
companies. For those years, I combined the lists based on market capitalization to generate a measure
that is comparable to subsequent years.
116
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from further government contracts, reducing DOJ’s litigation leverage upon
intervention.118
To test the extent to which DOJ might seek to leverage the efforts of
less experienced or less sophisticated counsel, I interacted the two counsel
measures described previously, TOPRELATORFIRM and MIDRELATORFIRM,
with FORTUNE100. If DOJ takes account of imbalances in relator and
defense capacities, then we might expect to see higher intervention rates in
cases pitting MIDRELATORFIRM counsel against Fortune 100 companies
(where imbalances are small but remediable) compared to cases brought by
TOPCOUNSEL firms against similarly well-heeled defendants (where
imbalances are small or nonexistent). That said, and as noted previously,
there is little clear evidence that DOJ has adopted a strategy of delegating
enforcement authority to more competent enforcers by declining cases,
making it unlikely that the interaction terms will detect a leveraging
effect.119
A fourth set of variables explores possible political correlates of DOJ
intervention decisionmaking. To test for the possibility of overhead
political control at DOJ or the primary agency, I constructed a dummy
variable, CASEELECTEDDEM, indicating whether the case reached a DOJ
intervention decision during the Clinton or Obama Administrations, the
two periods of Democratic control of the Executive Branch in my sample.
A related dummy variable, CASEFILEDDEM, indicates if the case was filed
during the Clinton or Obama Administrations and thus seeks to control for
once-removed effects of partisan control: if would-be relators perceive a
partisan political slant to DOJ intervention decisionmaking, then they may
be more likely to file suit when DOJ is controlled by a sympathetic
administration, resulting in more and more marginal (weaker)
complaints.120
A fifth cluster of indicator variables is designed to test whether
intervention is more or less likely when the alleged fraud concerns federal
programs overseen by particular primary agencies. As noted previously,
DOJ treats its relationship with primary agencies as that of attorney and
client, and some have suggested that certain departments and agencies are
less likely to support intervention, either because of overhead political

118
See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Side Effects May Include Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 3, 2010, at 1 (noting
the possibility that “some companies are ‘too big to debar’ from government contracts, since doing so
would just hurt patients needing medicine” (quoting Lew Morris, chief counsel for the inspector general
of the Department of Health and Human Services)).
119
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
120
See John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications
Litigation, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 501, 502–03 (2005) (accounting for strategic litigant selection effects
in model of judicial decisionmaking); see also David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and
Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (noting importance of taking
account of litigant selection effects in deriving empirical estimates related to civil litigation).
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control or organizational resistance.121 The models reported below include
dummy variables that take a value of one in any case alleging fraud on each
of three executive departments, including the Departments of Health and
Human Services (HEALTH), Defense (DEFENSE), and the Interior
(INTERIOR). These three are the agencies most frequently implicated in qui
tam suits—and, in the case of Defense and Interior, are also commonly
perceived by relators’ counsel as most subject to patterns of political
control or organizational opposition to qui tam.
A final set of variables explores the extent to which DOJ makes
intervention decisions in order to police collusive settlements. Here I
exploit the Ninth Circuit’s Killingsworth decision, as described previously,
which held that DOJ possesses an absolute veto right over a proposed
settlement only where it has previously intervened in the case.122 To test for
Killingsworth’s possible impact, I created a dummy variable,
NINTHCIRCUITRULING, taking a value of one in any sample case filed and
drawing a DOJ election decision in a federal district court within the Ninth
Circuit after Killingsworth. I also include a further pair of dummy
variables, AFTERNINTH and NINTHCIRCUIT, to ensure I am measuring the
differences-in-differences effect of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.123 If DOJ has
been more likely to intervene in district courts bound by Killingsworth in
order to preserve its ability to veto private settlements, then the main
variable of the three should show a positive effect on DOJ’s propensity to
intervene.
The remaining variables in the models are time controls, including a
pair of variables, CASEFILEDYEAR and CASEELECTEDYEAR, which
account for the possibility of a simple time trend keyed either to litigant
filings or DOJ case elections.
Column (A) in Table 2 presents the regression results without the
counsel and Fortune 100 interaction terms designed to detect DOJ efforts to
leverage private enforcement capacity. Column (B) reports the full model.
In a logit model, raw coefficients are not directly interpretable and so are
reported as odds ratios. In the discussion below, the results are further
transformed into marginal effects, defined as the change in probability of
121

See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
123
These additional variables wash (or “difference”) out any trends that are common to the Ninth
Circuit and other circuits and might otherwise obscure Killingsworth’s true effect. For further
explanation of the “differences-in-differences” approach, see infra notes 133–35 and accompanying
text. Note, however, that I do not include similar dummy variables for the decisions of other U.S.
Courts of Appeals that have come out the other way. See supra note 62. This is based on my view that
the weight of authority at the district court level in all circuits apart from the Ninth is that DOJ enjoys
an absolute veto right, leaving little theoretical reason to believe DOJ would seek to protect its veto
rights any more vigorously within those circuits with published decisions declining to follow
Killingsworth than in any other district court outside the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, I include only
variables for the Ninth Circuit’s unique decision.
122
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DOJ intervention based on a one-unit rise or fall in the independent
variable in question or, for dummies, a move from zero to one.124
As Table 2 indicates, a number of variables are statistically significant
and substantively important. First, the findings suggest that DOJ’s
intervention calculus is sensitive to resource constraints. All else equal, a
one-unit increase in DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT—admittedly a substantial
increase for a variable ranging from zero to 1.07—correlates with a roughly
11% drop in the likelihood of DOJ intervention. In practical terms, DOJ
was significantly less likely to intervene in cases in the late 1990s and early
2000s, as DOJ’s inventory of intervened cases reached its peak, compared
to earlier in the post-1986 regime’s lifespan, with relatively greater
likelihood of intervention, all else equal, during the later 2000s as a drop in
qui tam filings eased resource constraints somewhat. That said, the
September 11 terrorist attacks do not appear to have affected DOJ
intervention decisions, contrary to what some commentators have
claimed.125

124

More specifically, a “marginal effect” measures the change in the dependent variable for each
one-unit increase in the relevant independent variable holding all other independent variables at their
means. For a useful primer on odds ratios in logistic regression and why marginal effects provide a
more behaviorally interpretable metric, see FAQ: How Do I Interpret Odds Ratios in Logistic
Regression?, UCLA: STATISTICAL CONSULTING GRP., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/
general/odds_ratio.htm (last visited July 22, 2013).
125
See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Note that the fact that the 911RESOURCECONSTRAINT
coefficient is precisely estimated at 1 raises the concern that the variable might be perfectly collinear
with another variable. However, and as reported in note 114, supra, the inclusion of alternative
specifications of the 9/11 variable in the models did not produce materially different results.
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TABLE 2: LOGIT MODEL PREDICTING DOJ INTERVENTION IN QUI TAM CASES, 1986–2011
(A)

(B)

Odds Ratio
(S.E.)
0.513**
(0.174)
1.000
(0.000349)
0.666***
(0.0728)
1.760***
(0.227)
1.056
(0.0884)
0.657***
(0.103)
0.588**
(0.122)

1.548***
(0.156)
1.613***
(0.215)
1.065
(0.385)
2.356**
(0.834)
0.980
(0.123)
0.965
(0.102)
0.484***
(0.0147)
1.866***
(0.0539)

Odds Ratio
(S.E.)
0.514**
(0.175)
1.000
(0.000349)
0.666***
(0.0728)
1.726***
(0.233)
1.062
(0.0921)
0.654**
(0.140)
0.588**
(0.122)
1.189
(0.468)
0.933
(0.292)
1.550***
(0.156)
1.614***
(0.215)
1.067
(0.386)
2.348**
(0.832)
0.979
(0.123)
0.965
(0.102)
0.484***
(0.0147)
1.867***
(0.0540)

Observations

4326

4326

Pseudo R2

0.172

0.172

0

0

DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT
911RESOURCECONSTRAINT
EXPERIENCEDRELATOR
TOPRELATORFIRM
MIDRELATORFIRM
FORTUNE100
DEFENSE50
TOPRELATORFIRM*FORTUNE100
MIDRELATORFIRM*FORTUNE100
HEALTH
DEFENSE
INTERIOR
NINTHCIRCUITRULING
CASEFILEDDEM
CASEELECTEDDEM
CASEFILEDYEAR
CASEELECTEDYEAR

Chi square test

Notes: Dependent variable in both models is a binary indicator as to whether DOJ intervened in
the case. Lower order interaction terms (AFTERNINTH, NINTHCIRCUIT) are omitted from the
presentation. All coefficients are reported as odds ratios, with marginal effects of significant
variables presented in the text. Significance as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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My results likewise confirm the findings of past research regarding the
role of repeat play within the qui tam regime: experienced relators who
have filed at least one prior qui tam suit (EXPERIENCEDRELATOR) are 10%
less likely to achieve DOJ intervention than one-shotters, while relator-side
counsel with ten or more cases in their past portfolio of representations
(TOPRELATORFIRM) are roughly 9% more likely to win DOJ
intervention.126 This latter result, when combined with the finding that DOJ
is resource constrained, is troubling. If DOJ selects more meritorious cases
brought by more experienced and capable qui tam plaintiffs’ firms, but its
decisionmaking also appears sensitive to resource constraints, then this
may suggest a perverse allocation of public resources. To be sure, and as
noted previously, DOJ might commit fewer resources to cases brought by
more competent private enforcers, effecting an implicit delegation of
enforcement authority.127 And yet, intervention still entails assigning a linelevel attorney to the case who must then fully engage in motions practice
and discovery. To that extent, DOJ participation is not costless, particularly
if doing so precludes intervention in other meritorious cases. I return to this
issue in Part IV.
The results for FORTUNE100 and DEFENSE50 are consistent with
expectation and statistically significant. All else equal, DOJ is roughly 7%
less likely to intervene in cases brought against Fortune 100 companies,
and 8% less likely to intervene in cases brought against top defense
contractors. Of course, the precise causal mechanism here cannot be
pinpointed. Low intervention rates might result from political influence,
DOJ timidity in the face of the greater litigation resources such defendants
can deploy, or, in the case of large, critically important defense contractors,
the reduced litigation leverage DOJ can expect to have because of the
unavailability of debarment from government business as a remedial
option. An alternative explanation is that Fortune 100 companies draw
more marginal qui tam complaints because they are perceived by relators as
having deeper pockets or being more sensitive to public relations concerns.
Neither of these latter possibilities, however, offers a fully persuasive
rejoinder, particularly plaintiff perceptions of deeper pockets, which should
also translate into greater available defense-side litigation resources.
Another striking finding is the substantial effect of the Ninth Circuit’s
Killingsworth ruling on DOJ intervention decisions. All else equal, postKillingsworth cases initiated in district courts encompassed by the Ninth
Circuit were roughly 14% more likely to win intervention, suggesting that
the doctrinal threat to DOJ’s ability to veto collusive settlements had a
126
These effects are broadly consistent with findings from an earlier regression analysis using the
same data as here: first, that repeat relators are substantially less likely to win DOJ intervention but
achieve larger recoveries when they do; and second, that repeat counsel are both more likely to win
intervention and achieve larger recoveries. See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1313.
127
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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substantial impact on its intervention calculus. Rerunning the analysis
using placebo versions of NINTHCIRCUITRULING—that is, artificially
moving the date of the Ninth Circuit’s decision forward or backward in
time—confirmed the robustness of this finding.128
The variables designed to capture partisan political drivers of DOJ
decisionmaking or the effect of political control or organizational resistance
at particular primary agencies returned mixed results. First, neither
CASEELECTEDDEM, nor its litigant-expectation variant, CASEFILEDDEM,
produced statistically significant results. I return to the question of whether
partisan political control of DOJ might be driving intervention
decisionmaking using a more sophisticated empirical approach in Part
III.D. By contrast, the agency dummies yielded strong and statistically
significant results, in keeping with Figure 2’s presentation of different
intervention rates across case types. All else equal, cases alleging fraud on
the Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of
Defense were 7% and 8% more likely, respectively, to draw DOJ
intervention. By contrast, cases alleging fraud on the Department of the
Interior, which has drawn significant fire for internal corruption and alleged
partisanship of agency leaders,129 did not show a statistically significant
difference relative to other case types.
Finally, the cluster of variables designed to test possible DOJ efforts to
leverage less competent counsel in cases brought against Fortune 100
companies reveals no evidence that DOJ is playing such a role, with neither
interaction term returning a statistically significant result. This may just
confirm that, to the extent DOJ leverages the litigation efforts of less
competent counsel, it manifests in the amount of resources DOJ allocates
across cases rather than formal intervention decisions.
To be sure, the regression findings should be viewed with caution. The
most obvious problem is omitted variable bias: because we cannot directly
observe case quality, estimates of the marginal effect of various covariates
128

Despite the apparent robustness of the Killingsworth findings, it remains possible that some
other factor explains DOJ’s greater post-Killingsworth propensity to intervene in cases within the Ninth
Circuit. For instance, some qui tam practitioners suggested that an alternative explanation for DOJ’s
more liberal intervention stance is the California presence of law firm Phillips & Cohen LLP, which
enjoys one of the highest DOJ intervention rates among highly active relator-side firms. However, the
data tend to point away from a Phillips & Cohen effect. Among other things, Phillips & Cohen was just
as active in the pre-Killingsworth period. More importantly, California is also home to one of the other
most active relator-side law firms, Warren Benson Law Group, which has one of the lower DOJ
intervention rates among relator-side firms. See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1302 (reporting firmspecific success rates).
129
See Ian Urbina, Inspector General’s Inquiry Faults Actions of Federal Drilling Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2010, at A16 (noting critics’ concerns about “a culture of lax oversight and cozy ties to
industry”); Thomas Frank, Op-Ed., The Gulf Spill and the Revolving Door, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2010,
at A17 (noting similar concerns). For a more skeptical scholarly view, see Christopher Carrigan,
Captured by Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 33.
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on DOJ intervention may be biased. Even so, a convincing composite
picture begins to emerge. DOJ makes intervention decisions strategically,
in the sense that its decision calculus appears driven at least in part by
factors separate and apart from consideration of pure merits, whether
resource constraints, judicial threats to its ability to police collusive
settlements, or the defendant’s identity. This suggests that judicial
inferences linking DOJ decisions to case merit may be wrongheaded.
D. Merits-Screening Versus Merits-Making and Partisan Political Control
of DOJ: Quasi-Differences in Differences and Defense-Specific Analysis
The empirical portrait presented thus far establishes that DOJ
intervention decisionmaking is, at least in part, strategic in nature. But none
of the results makes substantial headway on a pair of critically important
questions. First, to what extent is DOJ a merits screener or a merits maker?
Second, to what extent is DOJ gatekeeping, particularly its intervention
decisionmaking, subject to partisan political control? As noted previously,
these questions go to the core of debates about whether courts should draw
merits inferences from DOJ intervention decisions and the extent to which
private enforcement might serve an agency-forcing or anticapture role.130
On the first question, disentangling DOJ’s merits-screening and
merits-making ability is difficult because of a classic causal inference
problem: DOJ intervention stands as both a selection mechanism and a
treatment effect in ways that ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of
recovery amounts on DOJ intervention cannot distinguish. Worse, DOJ
intervention is endogenous with unobserved variables—namely, case
merit—and will thus be correlated with the error term, risking inconsistent
OLS estimates. A standard approach to work around such problems is
instrumental variables estimation.131 By using an instrumental variable that
separately (and exogenously) predicts DOJ intervention, one can derive an
estimate of DOJ’s merits-making power that, when compared to an
unadjusted measure of DOJ intervention on recoveries, yields an
unconfounded estimate of DOJ’s merits-screening effect. The logit analysis
presented previously contains a promising instrument: the Ninth Circuit’s
Killingsworth decision strongly increased DOJ’s propensity to intervene in
cases initiated within that circuit—presumably because of DOJ’s desire to
preserve its absolute-settlement-veto rights—and yet should not have
separately impacted the likelihood or size of an eventual recovery.
However, results of a standard two-stage least squares (“2SLS”) analysis
using Killingsworth as an instrument are heavily dependent on the choice

130

See supra notes 16–18, 71–75 and accompanying text.
See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 114, 131–33 (2009).
131
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of dependent variable, with postestimation diagnostics suggesting a
relatively weak instrument.132
An alternative, but more tentative, identification strategy likewise
exploits the Ninth Circuit’s Killingsworth decision and its apparent effect
on DOJ’s propensity to intervene, this time by estimating the resulting
impact on recovery size in intervened as against declined cases. The result
is an estimation strategy that resembles a differences-in-differences
approach. Suppose, for instance, that DOJ has an ability and desire to
screen cases on the basis of expected value (i.e., the probability of a
recovery times the recovery amount), thus creating a pool of relatively
stronger intervened cases and a pool of relatively weaker declined cases.
Killingsworth, by inducing DOJ to intervene in a tranche of cases it would
not have taken previously, should thus yield a decline in average case value
among intervened cases, as DOJ dips more deeply into the case pool and
takes cases it would not have before.133 Interestingly, this should also
reduce average case value in the declined pool, since a DOJ with meritsscreening capacity can be expected to select the higher-expected-value
cases from the previously declined pool, for which collusive settlements
impose the greatest cost. Further erosion of average case value in the
declined pool may also result from a strategic response by relators: if DOJ
is perceived to be more interventionist than before, then rational relators
will file more and more marginal cases, since the expected value of any
particular case—with that value a function, at least in part, of DOJ’s
132
Using recovery dollars as the dependent variable, the Killingsworth instrument yields a strong
and statistically significant coefficient at the first stage (p = 0.014) but a weak overall first-stage
prediction of DOJ intervention (F-stat = 3.43, p = 0.016), well below the F-statistic of 10 that some see
as a threshold requirement. Worse, the second-stage prediction of the impact of DOJ intervention on
recovery dollars produces large standard errors (p = 0.819), yielding a highly imprecise estimate of
DOJ’s merits-making power. By contrast, when a logarithmic transformation of recovery dollars (i.e.,
the log of 1-plus-the-recovery-amount, to account for zero recoveries) is substituted as the dependent
variable, the 2SLS analysis performs far better, yielding a positive and strongly significant coefficient
on government intervention at the second stage, implying that DOJ intervention has a substantial
merits-making impact. Post-estimation diagnostics, including a Durbin and Wu-Hausman test, reject the
null hypothesis that GOVTINTERVENED is exogenous, implying that 2SLS is preferable to OLS. But
there is a problem: comparing the second-stage estimate of the effect of DOJ intervention to a simple
(one-stage) OLS estimate of intervention’s effect on logged recovery-dollar amounts suggests that DOJ
intervention, stripped of its merits-making effect, negatively impacts recovery size. In other words, DOJ
merits screening reduces case value. This seems highly unlikely, suggesting that a weak instrument is
biasing the results.
133
A rational DOJ focused on maximizing total recoveries will intervene in additional cases postKillingsworth only until the marginal return on resources devoted to doing so equals the return on those
resources if spent elsewhere. Put more concretely, additional interventions impose a cost on DOJ,
reducing the resources it can put towards litigating cases already in the intervened pool. As a result,
DOJ will intervene in additional cases only until the value of the prevented collusion equals the loss of
case value due to the diminished resources available to litigate cases already in the intervened pool.
Note that diminished resources available to litigate intervened cases should also further erode average
case value within the intervened pool, strengthening the prediction of a negative quasi-differences-indifferences estimator.
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propensity to intervene—will be higher than before. The end result is no
clear directional hypothesis, with a net effect on recovery amounts across
intervened and declined cases before and after Killingsworth that could be
positive, negative, or zero.
Still, measuring Killingsworth’s impact in this way may permit
recovery of an informative estimate. Indeed, apart from the likely decrease
in average case value in the intervened pool, all of the remaining predicted
impacts—the removal of the strongest cases from the declined pool and
relator adjustment to a more interventionist DOJ—point to a positive net
effect. Thus, a negative net effect on recovery size across intervened and
declined cases before and after Killingsworth can be interpreted as a lower
bound measure of DOJ’s ability to engage in merits screening of qui tam
cases relative to a DOJ without any merits-screening capacity at all.134
To derive estimates of Killingsworth’s net effect along these lines, I
specify a regression model:
yit = α + β1Xit + β2INTERVENi + β3τi + β4γi + β5(τi * INTERVENi) +
β6(γi * INTERVENi) + β7(γi * τi) + β8(γi * τi * INTERVENi) + ei
where y is recovery dollars in case i at time t, with t = {0,1} specifying the
time period before (t = 0) and after (t = 1) Killingsworth, INTERVEN is an
indicator variable equal to one if DOJ intervened in case i and zero
otherwise, τ is an indicator variable equal to one if DOJ made its election
decision after Killingsworth, γ is an indicator variable equal to one if the
case falls within the Ninth Circuit, and Xit is a vector of other observable
case characteristics. The main coefficient of interest is β8, which captures
the “treatment” effect of DOJ intervention via a triple interaction term
predicting recoveries in (i) intervened cases (ii) initiated within the Ninth
Circuit (iii) after Killingsworth.
To be sure, this identification strategy has shortcomings. It is not a true
differences-in-differences approach, in that we are analyzing the treatment
effect of DOJ decisions within a common pool of cases rather than, say, the
effect of adopting a minimum wage law in a state compared to a state that
did not adopt such a law.135 The approach does, however, retain at least
134
Implicit in the above is the observation that changes in the intervention propensity of a DOJ
without any capacity to accurately screen case merits but with a strong merits-making effect will not
generate any net effect on recovery size in intervened as compared to declined cases, as DOJ’s
decisions before and after any change in its intervention calculus will be random draws from the case
pool. In particular, even if relators file more and more marginal cases in response to DOJ’s more
interventionist stance, this should not impact the spread between the mean intervened recovery and the
mean declined recovery, as DOJ’s allocation of the more marginal population of cases to the intervened
and declined pools will remain random.
135
In technical terms, we thus lack an exogenously determined group that is subject to treatment. In
addition to this problem, estimating net effects across intervened and declined cases does not solve the
endogeneity problem that an instrumental variables approach would: it remains the case that
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some of the advantages of differences in differences: by estimating what
amounts to a pre-post, within-subjects difference of treatment and control
groups, it controls for (i.e., “differences out”) unobserved features of the
qui tam enforcement environment, such as changes in average case value
over time, mitigating some of the concern about omitted variable bias.
The approach also has the advantage of flexibility, as it can be used to
explore other aspects of DOJ intervention decisionmaking, including the
relationship between partisan political control of DOJ and qui tam litigation
outcomes. Suppose, as some critics have claimed, that a Republicancontrolled DOJ has a “taste” for a less interventionist approach compared
to a Democrat-controlled DOJ. A choosier Republican DOJ with the
capacity to screen good and bad cases will thus intervene in stronger cases
relative to its Democratic counterparts, resulting in higher average
recoveries in intervened cases.136 But by taking fewer cases, a Republican
DOJ with merits-screening capacity will also consign to the declined pool a
tranche of cases that a Democratic DOJ would take, and these cases will
tend to be stronger than the cases that previously made up the declined
pool, increasing average case value. As with the Killingsworth example,
relators may also adjust, this time filing fewer and stronger cases, further
boosting average case value among declined cases. As before, the end
result may be a net effect that is positive, negative, or zero, depending on
the magnitude of the various effects. And yet, a positive net effect on
average case value in intervened and declined case pools across a
changeover from Democratic to Republican control can be interpreted as
the result of a choosier DOJ with merits-screening capacity, as all other
predicted effects—the relatively higher recovery value in the declined pool
and a possible strategic response by relators—point to a negative net
difference.
As a final application of the differences-in-differences approach,
consider a DOJ that, as some critics have contended, has a fully arbitrary
“distaste” for defense-procurement cases—perhaps as part of an effort to
deflect attention from politically unpopular war efforts. In contrast to the
previous example, DOJ’s purely political refusal to take up defenseprocurement cases that would normally draw intervention will not affect
average case value in the intervened pool, since those decisions are
arbitrary from a merits (or expected-value) perspective. But arbitrary
expulsions of cases from the intervened pool will boost average case value

unobservable case merit affects both the probability of a recovery and DOJ’s decision to intervene,
risking inconsistent OLS estimates.
136
Cf. Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions,
103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 534, 537 (2009) (using a similar approach to identify and estimate partisan bias
in political corruption investigations and prosecutions). Intervening in fewer cases will also free up
resources that can then be put toward the intervened cases that remain, further boosting average case
value.
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in the declined pool relative to the cases already there, as all cases in the
previously intervened pool will be stronger than those in the declined pool.
Following the same logic as above (including a possible strategic relator
response), a negative net effect on average case value in intervened and
declined defense-procurement cases across the Bush43 Administration and
other administrations can thus be interpreted as evidence of politicized
decisionmaking.
Table 3 presents regression results using many of the same
independent variables from before but with unlogged and logged inflationand
adjusted
recovery
dollar
amounts
(RECOVERYDOLLARS
LOGRECOVERYDOLLARS) as the dependent variables in Columns (A) and
(B), respectively, and GOVTINTERVENED now included as an independent
variable.137 New variables include: (i) CASECLOSEDYEAR, a time trend
variable; (ii) indicator variables capturing whether a case drew a DOJ
election decision during each of three presidential administrations
(CASEELECTEDCLINTON, CASEELECTEDBUSH43, CASEELECTEDOBAMA)
with Bush41 thus serving as the baseline category; and
(iii) TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE, a triple interaction term of DEFENSE,
CASEELECTEDBUSH43, and GOVTINTERVENED designed to gauge
differences between the Bush43 and other administrations in defense cases.
Descriptive statistics for these variables, as well as associated lower order
interaction terms also included in the models,138 are set forth in the
Appendix.

137
As is customary when using logarithmic transformations to re-express variables, I take the log of
inflation-adjusted recovery dollars plus $1 to account for losing (zero-dollar) cases.
138
These include: (i) INTERVENDEFENSE, a variable interacting GOVTINTERVENED and DEFENSE;
(ii)
BUSH43DEFENSE,
a
variable
interacting
DEFENSE
and
CASEELECTEDBUSH43;
(iii) INTERVENEDCLINTON, INTERVENEDBUSH43, INTERVENEDOBAMA, variables interacting each
administration election variable with GOVTINTERVENED; and (iv) TRIPLEKILLINGSWORTH,
INTERVENNINTHCIRCUIT, INTERVENKILLINGSWORTH, additional interaction terms for the tripledifferences Killingsworth analysis.
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TABLE 3: OLS MODEL PREDICTING RECOVERY DOLLARS IN QUI TAM CASES, 1986–2011

TRIPLEKILLINGSWORTH
INTERVENEDCLINTON
INTERVENEDBUSH43
INTERVENEDOBAMA
TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE
GOVTINTERVENED
DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT
EXPERIENCEDRELATOR
TOPRELATORFIRM
FORTUNE100
DEFENSE50
HEALTH
DEFENSE
INTERIOR
CASEFILEDYEAR
CASECLOSEDYEAR
Observations
Adjusted R2
F-Stat (p-value)

(A)

(B)

-29.64**
(12.79)
9.396
(11.58)
11.08
(12.02)
15.23
(12.34)
-3.046
(6.904)
8.368
(8.896)
-2.330
(4.810)
6.166***
(1.625)
4.242**
(2.029)
5.941**
(2.347)
0.496
(3.194)
1.616
(1.498)
-1.157
(2.840)
15.65***
(4.993)
-2.703***
(0.358)
2.045***
(0.334)
3817
0.074
0.000

-1.921
(1.374)
0.529
(1.244)
0.397
(1.292)
0.785
(1.325)
0.500
(0.742)
11.17***
(0.956)
-0.712
(0.517)
-0.397**
(0.175)
0.310
(0.218)
-0.381
(0.252)
0.870**
(0.343)
0.0167
(0.161)
-0.217
(0.305)
-0.549
(0.536)
-0.369***
(0.0384)
0.366***
(0.0359)
3817

0.666
0.000

Notes: Dependent variable is inflation-adjusted recovery in (A) and logged inflation-adjusted
recovery plus $1 in (B). Standard errors are in parentheses. Lower order interaction terms
NINTHCIRCUIT,
INTERVENNINTHCIRCUIT,
INTERVENKILLINGSWORTH,
(AFTERNINTH,
CASEELECTEDCLINTON, CASEELECTEDBUSH43, CASEELECTEDOBAMA, BUSH43DEFENSE,
INTERVENDEFENSE) are omitted from presentation. Significance as follows: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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As reflected in Table 3, regression analysis returned only a single
statistically meaningful result among the five main coefficients of interest,
and only in the unlogged version of the model. Specifically, the difference
in the recovery between intervened and declined cases within the Ninth
Circuit before versus after Killingsworth is roughly $29 million smaller
than the difference before versus after Killingsworth in district courts
outside the Ninth Circuit. To be sure, this result is hardly authoritative,
especially given the lack of a significant result, even at the 90% confidence
level, in the logged version of the model (i.e., Column (B)). Still, the
analysis offers at least some empirical evidence that DOJ possesses meritsscreening capacity, contrary to claims that DOJ decisionmaking is wholly
arbitrary. Indeed, a DOJ without the ability to sift more and less
meritorious cases (but a greater post-Killingsworth propensity to intervene,
as suggested by Table 2’s earlier regression analysis) would generate no
change in average case value in intervened cases relative to declined cases
in the Ninth Circuit before versus after Killingsworth compared to other
cases. Rerunning the models with placebo versions of the Killingsworthrelated variables—moving the date of the Ninth Circuit’s decision forward
or backward in time—suggests that the finding is robust.139

139
Beyond placebo tests, we can also test the validity of the results of the Killingsworth analysis by
examining the decision’s other effects within the system, including filing rates (to explore whether
Killingsworth or DOJ’s response to it induced a strategic relator response) and recovery rates (to ensure
that DOJ’s greater propensity to intervene translated into a comparably higher win rate as well). One
way to test for a post-Killingsworth filing increase is a full-blown time-series model focused on filing
rates (i.e., number of filings per capita in the Ninth Circuit before and after Killingsworth relative to
cases outside the Ninth Circuit). A simpler way to gain at least some empirical purchase on the issue is
a more modest descriptive comparison of filing trends, measured both in terms of filing counts and also
as a proportion of total filings. A simple filing-count analysis, however, reveals little discernible
difference inside and outside the Ninth Circuit, with filing trends roughly mirroring each other—e.g.,
increases during the mid- to late-1990s and a pronounced decline in the early- to mid-2000s. Results for
filings measured as a proportion of total activity are more interesting: the Ninth Circuit’s proportion of
filings jumped substantially in 1995 and 1996 in Killingsworth’s wake, from 18% in 1994 to 23% and
then 26% in 1995 and 1996, respectively, then fell thereafter to a steady state of 14% to 20% for the
remainder of the study period. This, then, would appear to support, if only weakly, the possibility of a
strategic relator response immediately following Killingsworth. Measuring changes in DOJ’s postKillingsworth win rate can be accomplished in either of two ways. One is to use the same logit model as
in Table 2, but substituting an indicator variable for whether each case produced a recovery, and
omitting GOVTINTERVENED as a right-hand variable. However, given the tight coupling of DOJ
intervention and the probability of a recovery, doing so will not tell us much. And indeed, the analysis
returned results that are quite similar to Table 2’s logit analysis, implying a 14% greater likelihood of
achieving a recovery after Killingsworth in cases within the Ninth Circuit, with the difference strongly
statistically significant. An alternative is to use the same quasi-differences-in-differences approach
deployed in Table 3 but replacing logged recovery amounts with an indicator variable capturing
whether or not each case generated a recovery at all. Doing so returns a coefficient on the Killingsworth
triple-interaction term implying a 4% decline in the probability of a recovery in intervened cases
relative to declined cases before and after Killingsworth, but the result is not statistically significant.
Neither of these analyses of recovery rates is contrary to expectation or otherwise raises red flags for the
above account.
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Turning to the question of possible partisan political control of DOJ,
none of the three variables designed to test differences in outcomes across
the Clinton, Bush43, and Obama Administrations, respectively, returned
statistically significant coefficients. This suggests little or no relationship
between overhead political control of DOJ and litigation outcomes across
the run of qui tam cases. Rerunning the models across all case types with
narrower bandwidth—e.g., running regressions on pairs of administrations,
or constraining the sample to the final three years of an administration and
the first three years of the next—likewise yielded no results that are
statistically different from zero.
While the variable TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE likewise did not yield a
meaningful coefficient in Table 3’s regression model, suggesting the
absence of any partisan dynamic in defense-procurement cases in
particular, further analysis paints a more complicated portrait. First,
rerunning the regression model constraining the sample to defense-only
cases elected during the Bush43 and Obama Administrations finds a
positive difference of $3.4 million in average recoveries across intervened
and declined cases during the Obama Administration compared to
intervened and declined cases during the Bush43 Administration, with the
result statistically significant at the 90% level. Put another way, this offers
weak evidence that the Obama DOJ did better in defense cases it joined
compared to cases it declined than did the Bush43 DOJ. A more direct,
pairwise comparison thus lends at least some credence to recent public
statements of the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division
implying that the Obama DOJ has been more aggressive and achieved
greater success in defense cases than the Bush43 DOJ.140
This does not exhaust analysis of partisan political dynamics in DOJ
oversight, however. Recall that the critique of the Bush43 DOJ’s handling
of defense-procurement cases is not just that DOJ was less likely to
intervene in defense cases related to controversial war efforts, but also that
DOJ affirmatively sat on such cases, avoiding case-election decisions
altogether.141 If true, the result should have been a pool of relatively
meritorious “holdover” cases on which DOJ deferred action during the
Bush43 Administration and that the Obama DOJ then took up. This would
help to explain the relatively higher mean recoveries since the beginning of
As a final quality check, note that alternative regression approaches did not produce materially
different results from those presented in Table 3. In particular, using a tobit (rather than OLS) model
produced a similar result for the main Killingsworth interaction term, narrowly missing statistical
significance at the 95% level in the unlogged version of the model. Alternatively, rerunning the
regressions constraining the sample to winning cases only (that is, dropping cases for which the
dependent variable was zero in Table 3’s models), weakens the significance of the Killingsworth result
substantially, perhaps reflecting the smaller sample size, but is still consistent with theoretical
expectation in terms of sign. Results of these further modeling efforts are available upon request.
140
See Civil Division, supra note 19.
141
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
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the Obama Administration. But any systematic Bush43 DOJ practice of
sitting on defense cases should also be directly observable in the form of
longer investigation times—that is, the elapsed time between filing and a
DOJ case-election decision—for defense cases taken up by the Obama DOJ
compared to defense cases taken up by the Bush43 DOJ and all other case
types during either administration.
FIGURE 6: MEAN DOJ INVESTIGATION TIME BY CASE-ELECTION YEAR AND
QUI TAM CASE “TYPE,” 1986–2011

Figure 6 explores this possibility by plotting the mean number of days
that cases were under DOJ investigation prior to a DOJ case-election
decision over the period 1986–2011, in all cases and by case type (health,
defense). As an initial matter, the line plots show that investigation times
have risen steadily over the life of the regime. More arresting for our
narrower purposes is the substantial recent variability of defense cases:
investigation times in defense cases fell precipitously in 2007 at the tail end
of the Bush43 Administration, then climbed to a historic peak in 2009
during the first year of the Obama Administration, falling again thereafter.
This combination of a steep decline as war efforts proceeded followed by a
steep increase is consistent with a view that the Bush43 DOJ was quickly
dispatching some defense-oriented cases and sitting on others, leaving the
newly installed Obama DOJ with a large number of “holdover” cases on
which the Bush43 DOJ had deferred decision.
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TABLE 4: ATTRIBUTES OF QUI TAM DEFENSE-PROCUREMENT CASES DRAWING DOJ CASE-

ELECTION DECISIONS ACROSS THE BUSH43 AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS, 2007–2010
Mean/Median

DOJ

Days Under
Investigation

Intervene
Rate (%)

Mean

Case Type

Case
Tally

Recovery
Rate (%)

Recovery ($)

Bush43—All Defense
Cases

56

635/582

23.2

18.9

$15.9

8

538/404

12.5

12.5

$4.1

48

652/597

25.0

20.0

$17.2

82

744/624

14.6

23.2

$13.6

25

827/875

16.0

16.7

$24.0

57

708/595

14.0

26.3

$10.4

(Winning
Cases Only)

Bush43—
Afghanistan/Iraq
Connection
Bush43—No
Afghanistan/Iraq
Connection
Obama—All Defense
Cases
Obama—
Afghanistan/Iraq
Connection
Obama—No
Afghanistan/Iraq
Connection
t-test (p value)
(across shaded
categories only)

__

-1.3800

1.2834

-0.5515

0.2555

(p = 0.170)

(p = 0.20)

(p = 0.582)

(p = 0.801)

Table 4 offers a still more granular analysis by presenting findings
from a review of all 138 defense-procurement cases with and without a
connection to war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan that drew a DOJ caseelection decision during the time window straddling the final two years of
the Bush43 Administration and the first two years of the Obama
Administration.142 None of the findings meet conventional levels of
statistical significance—which is expected given sample-size limitations—
and so interpretation should proceed with caution.143 Still, several broad
findings stand out.
142
The analysis that follows excludes twenty-seven defense-related cases for which case file
materials (and, in particular, complaints) were not available on PACER and could not otherwise be
obtained.
143
Table 4 reports simple t-tests across the shaded categories (“Bush43—All Defense Cases”;
“Obama—All Defense Cases”). Joint F-tests of equalities performed on the nonshaded categories
(Bush43 in war versus nonwar cases, Obama in war versus nonwar cases; Bush43 versus Obama in war
cases; Bush43 versus Obama in nonwar cases) similarly found a lack of statistical significance at
conventional (95%) levels.
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First, even apart from the lack of statistical significance, certain
measures reveal only small differences across administrations. Thus,
defense cases that reached DOJ election decisions during the Bush43 and
Obama Administrations within the four-year time window were under DOJ
investigation for roughly comparable periods of time (a mean of 635 days
versus 744 days, and a median of 582 versus 624 days). Similarly,
successful defense-related cases (with or without a direct link to war
efforts) across the two administrations during the time window produced
roughly comparable recovery amounts (a mean of $15.9 million versus
$13.6 million).
Other measures, however, suggest wider cross-administration
differences. As an initial matter, the Obama DOJ may have been choosier
in defense cases than its predecessor, intervening roughly 15% of the time
as against a 23% intervention rate during the Bush43 Administration. But
even more striking are the differences across the two administrations in
cases with and without a connection to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
Breaking out cases in this way confirms that the pronounced uptick in
investigation times for defense cases at the beginning of the Obama
Administration was substantially driven by war-related cases, with war
cases under investigation for an average of nearly 300 more days under
Obama than Bush43 (827 days versus 538 days). And indeed, closer
examination of the underlying cases reveals eleven war-related cases, all
filed during the Bush43 Administration, that had been under investigation
for more than 1000 days by the time the Obama DOJ reached a caseelection decision. Four of these eleven cases resulted in DOJ interventions,
including a case which had been open for more than five years alleging that
a military contractor had forged expiration dates in supplying food to
military bases in Iraq.144
The remaining measures further suggest potentially important
differences across administrations. Thus, the Obama DOJ’s propensity to
intervene appears consistent across cases with and without a war
connection (16% versus 14%). But the Bush43 DOJ was nearly half as
likely to intervene in cases with a war connection than in those without
(roughly 13% versus 25%). Perhaps most arresting of all are the patterns in
recovery amounts. War-related cases drawing DOJ election decisions
during the Bush43 Administration have achieved far lower recoveries than
cases without a war connection (approximately $4 million versus $17
million). But during the Obama Administration, that relationship has
flipped, with war-related cases yielding substantially larger recoveries ($24
144
See Relator Delma Pallares’s First Amended Complaint at 11–15, United States ex rel. Pallares
v. Itani, No. 4:05-cv-03018 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 2009); United States ex rel. Al-Sultan v. Pub.
Warehousing Co., K.S.C., No. 1-05-cv-02968 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2013); United States ex rel. Brown v.
APL Ltd., No. 3:04-cv-04424 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012); United States ex rel. Good v. Taylor, No. 5:08cv-00894 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2011).
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million versus around $10 million). The result is that war-related cases that
reached DOJ decisions under an Obama-controlled DOJ have generated
substantially higher recoveries—roughly six times higher—than warrelated cases drawing case-election decisions under Bush43.145
To be sure, there are alternative explanations for these defense-specific
findings that cannot be ruled out. The most significant inferential threat is
that the data suffer from a type of left-censoring problem: because warrelated cases could not by definition be initiated until the outbreak of
hostilities, longer investigation times in cases drawing a DOJ decision
during the Obama Administration might reflect nothing more than the fact
that bigger, more complex cases take longer to investigate and so were
more likely to be held over from the Bush43 Administration.146 Even apart
from the lack of statistical significance, then, the analysis falls well short of
a definitive test regarding partisan political influence. Put another way,
while the data offer tentative evidence of a partisan political cast to DOJ
oversight, the above analysis can neither confirm nor exclude that
possibility, particularly the longstanding claim that the Bush43 DOJ
disfavored or soft-pedaled war-related defense-procurement cases.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In 1990, Senator Charles Grassley, the FCA’s most forceful champion
and quarterback of the 1986 amendments, assailed DOJ for timid
prosecution of fraud on the government during a congressional oversight
hearing: “It has been said in another context that war is too important to
leave to generals,” he intoned. “So too with antifraud efforts. They are too

145
This pattern holds when considering per-case recoveries: Iraq/Afghanistan per-case recoveries
are $4.0 million during Obama, compared to $0.5 million during Bush43, with nonwar recoveries
during Obama substantially lower at $2.7 million, and nonwar recoveries during Bush43 substantially
higher at $3.4 million.
146
A second alternative explanation is that uncertainty as to whether the Iraq Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) was an instrumentality of the United States government within the meaning of the
FCA delayed DOJ consideration of Iraq cases in particular. See United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v.
Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2009) (reversing district court’s dismissal on the
basis that CPA was not a government instrumentality); Jessica C. Morris, Note, Civil Fraud Liability
and Iraq Reconstruction: A Return to the False Claims Act’s War-Profiteering Roots?, 41 GA. L. REV.
623, 635–46 (2007) (providing overview of CPA issue). But here the data offer a definitive response:
dropping Iraq-related cases from the sample (and thus including only cases with or without a link to the
Afghanistan war, including cases with links to both wars) does not materially alter and even strengthens
the differences across the Bush43 and Obama Administrations. As just one example, the difference in
time under investigation across Afghanistan-war-related cases widens relative to the difference in the
sample that includes Iraq-related cases as well, with Bush43 cases under investigation for an average of
269 days and Obama cases under investigation for 722 days. A more plausible alternative explanation is
that DOJ waited to intervene in war-related cases until combat operations had wound down in both war
efforts to avoid compromising the flow of needed supplies (e.g., a weapon system exclusively provided
by a single company that, though not manufactured to contract specification, was nonetheless valuable
to military operations). Unfortunately, the data do not speak to this possibility.
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important to leave just to the Justice Department.”147 And yet Senator
Grassley had only a few years before he presided over a legislative revival
of the FCA that placed substantial power in DOJ’s hands to shape and
control qui tam litigation. The goal of this Article—twenty years later and
after repeated unanswered calls for empirical exploration of the FCA
regime148—has been to provide the first systematic assessment of DOJ’s
discharge of those statutory duties. The resulting findings have rich legal
and policy implications, both for the FCA—now a $3 billion behemoth149—
and beyond.
A. FCA Design Implications
Looking first to the FCA, the above analysis confirms the
longstanding criticism that DOJ too meekly deploys its authority to
terminate qui tam cases out from under relators.150 On this score, Congress
might consider ways to incentivize greater use of DOJ’s termination
authority. Perhaps the most plausible proposal would seek to alter DOJ
incentives by making DOJ jointly liable for attorney fee claims by
prevailing defendants in declined cases.151 Similarly, Congress might
consider amending the FCA to provide for a minimum recovery (at, say,
$200,000), with DOJ paying the difference if a successful unintervened qui
tam action recovers less.152
Beyond this, my analysis rejects the claim made by some that DOJ
intervention decisionmaking is random or that DOJ is solely a merits maker
that arbitrarily places the enormous weight of the government behind cases
and drives them to settlement. To the contrary, the evidence presented
above suggests that DOJ has the capacity to screen cases on merits
grounds, even at the margins. At the same time, however, my findings that
DOJ intervention is also driven by a host of strategic and plainly nonmerits-based factors casts doubt on claims advanced by the FCA’s
detractors that declined cases can and should be presumed meritless.
These findings have two critical implications. First, the findings
suggest that we should be concerned about the possibility that judicial
deference to DOJ intervention decisions with only an imperfect connection
to merits may be driving qui tam litigation outcomes.153 Simply put, forces
147
False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations, 101st Cong. 1, 2 (1990) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
148
See, e.g., Kovacic, Monitoring Devices, supra note 16, at 1841–42, 1856–57 (noting limited
nature of “[p]ublicly available data” on FCA regime and calling for “careful empirical assessment”);
Elameto, supra note 16, at 835 (calling for “increased transparency” regarding DOJ decisionmaking).
149
See Fraud Statistics, supra note 15 (noting 2012 qui tam recoveries of $3.35 billion).
150
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
151
See Rich, supra note 16, at 1275.
152
See Kwok, supra note 30, at 17.
153
See supra note 17 (collecting cases suggesting judicial deference to DOJ decisions).
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other than case merit contribute to DOJ intervention decisions; courts and
commentators should stop assuming otherwise.
Second, and for the same reason, the findings undercut proliferating
calls to eliminate the qui tam mechanism entirely by precluding relators
from going forward with cases in the absence of DOJ intervention. Doing
so might make sense for those who seek to facilitate greater DOJ control
over the direction and core purposes of the regime, or because the
transaction costs consumed by losing cases outstrip any social welfare
gains (a famously difficult calculation to make). But doing away with the
qui tam mechanism is not warranted on the ground that declined cases
necessarily lack objective indicia of merit.
B. Beyond the FCA
Stepping back and looking beyond the FCA, my analysis reveals a
number of underappreciated challenges in the institutional design of
litigation-oversight regimes. As noted previously, recent years have seen
proliferating calls to export the FCA’s qui tam and agency-oversight
mechanisms to regulatory arenas as diverse as civil rights, environmental
protection, tax, and securities.154 It is the securities context that has seen the
most frequent and vocal proposals. And it is also there that a qui tam-like
enforcement and oversight mechanism is most likely: the recent Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created a simple
cash-for-information whistleblower program that pays individuals for
information leading to a successful SEC enforcement action but does not,
in contrast to the FCA, grant them a private right of action to sue
independently on the government’s behalf.155 But that could change: Dodd–
Frank also ordered the SEC’s Inspector General to conduct a study to
determine whether that program should be built out into a full-on qui tam
regime that vests whistleblowers who have already tried to pursue the case
via the Commission with a private right of action.156 Published in early
2013, the Office of Inspector General’s report did not rule out a qui tam

154

See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2010) (providing for awards of ten to thirty percent of total monetary
sanctions collected to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide information to the Commission that leads
to a successful enforcement action). In 2011, the SEC promulgated substantial regulations governing
the bounty regimes. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300,
34,368 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F).
156
See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6) (instructing the Inspector General to conduct a
study of the whistleblower bounty regime, including “whether, in the interest of protecting investors
and identifying and preventing fraud, it would be useful for Congress to consider empowering
whistleblowers or other individuals, who have already attempted to pursue the case through the
Commission, to have a private right of action to bring suit based on the facts of the same case, on behalf
of the Government and themselves, against persons who have committed securities fraud”).
155
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approach, noting the need for further study.157 Importantly, Congress’s
possible interest in bringing qui tam to Dodd–Frank may be a bellwether:
in an era of deepening fiscal austerity, private enforcement should be an
increasingly attractive alternative to traditional—and on-budget—
regulatory mechanisms.158
To be sure, the applicability of my findings to securities or other
regulatory areas must confront the usual questions of generalizability. And
it is important to concede that the advisability of agency oversight
elsewhere in the American regulatory state will be heavily context
dependent. It is also relevant that the FCA is, in a number of key respects,
unusual or even sui generis in its structure and subject matter. FCA cases
are famously complex compared to, say, employment discrimination cases
because of their intersection with dense Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement regulations or the notoriously complex Federal Acquisition
Regulations. FCA lawsuits are also quite different from other private
enforcement regimes, such as securities or antitrust, in that the government
has unique access to information about FCA case merits, making DOJ a
potentially more reliable evaluator and signaler of case merits.159 One
should therefore be cautious about generalizing the above findings to other
contexts.
Even so, the findings presented above suggest some broad lessons that
can and should guide regulatory architects in the design of litigationoversight regimes while also pointing to potentially fruitful avenues for
future research. First, it is noteworthy that many existing calls for expanded
agency oversight of private litigation focus on the ability of agency
gatekeepers to terminate undesirable enforcement efforts.160 Yet the theory
and evidence presented above suggest that this is the task that a rational
agency, buffeted by political winds, is least likely to pursue.161 To the
extent policymakers hope that the SEC, for instance, could play a
substantial gatekeeper role by ensuring that certain securities class actions
never get off the ground, they should consider building in direct incentives
157
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM vi (2013), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/
2013/511.pdf (“Upon collecting additional data and assessing the effectiveness of the program after a
reasonable amount of time has passed, OIG will be in a better position to opine on the usefulness of
adding a private right of action to the SEC’s whistleblower program.”).
158
See BURKE, supra note 1, at 179 (hypothesizing that budgetary constraints may fuel a shift from
public to private enforcement); David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes,
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming
2015) (noting possible effect of fiscal conditions on legislative creation of bounty regimes); Sean
Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 827 (2008) (detailing a “budget constraint hypothesis” for rising use of private
litigation as a regulatory tool).
159
See Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 48.
160
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 6, at 1354.
161
See Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 58–59 (making this point).
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in order to induce the agency to carry out desired levels of case
termination. The best way to do so, as noted previously, may be to hold the
agency liable for a prevailing defendant’s fees or costs in declined cases or
establish a minimum recovery and put the agency on the hook for any
shortfall.162
A second broad lesson concerns the challenge of designing litigationoversight structures that promote the optimal mix of politically insulated
expertise and bureaucratic autonomy on the one hand and democratic
accountability on the other—an issue that echoes across theories of
regulation and administrative law.163 Consider as an example the FCA’s
tiered bounty system, whereby relators receive a higher proportion of
recoveries in declined cases. As noted previously, this structure was
initially designed as an agency-forcing measure to incentivize relators to go
it alone in the face of a bureaucracy unable or unwilling to enforce. But the
foregoing analysis suggests that tiered bounties create strong disincentives
for DOJ to fully delegate enforcement authority to capable and wellresourced private enforcers. This will be particularly true in large cases
because tiering raises the opportunity cost and, from the perspective of a
DOJ with rent-seeker tendencies, the “price” of full delegation.
To be sure, weighing the welfare gains of tiering’s agency-forcing or
anticapture effect against the welfare losses from suboptimal delegation of
enforcement authority to private enforcers is difficult. Even so, it is not
hard to see that tiering, initially crafted to incentivize relators to litigate
cases opposed by a risk-averse or captured bureaucracy, may instead
confound efficient management of private enforcement capacity by making
gatekeeper agencies less likely to rely on competent private enforcers.
Further research should model the likely consequences of eliminating tiered
recoveries, both on an agency’s oversight proclivities as well as the
willingness of private enforcers to initiate enforcement efforts in the first
place.
A third insight—and a third possible design lesson—concerns the
optimal degree of transparency within litigation oversight regimes, an issue
that once more implicates classic trade-offs among core administrativedesign values, particularly bureaucratic expertise/autonomy and political
accountability. Consider in this vein a recent bill in Congress designed to
increase the transparency of the FCA’s qui tam regime by imposing
heightened case-level reporting requirements on DOJ.164 In some ways, the
bill’s main provisions should strike experienced litigators as nonsensical, as
it would have required DOJ to report the “actual” amount of fraud,
apparently so that congressional overseers can measure the falloff in the
162

See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
164
Fighting Fraud to Protect Taxpayers Act of 2011, S. 890, 112th Cong. (2011).
163
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ultimate settlement or judgment.165 In other ways, however, transparency
proposals promise a welcome improvement over the current situation,
providing much-needed information about the basic contours of a critically
important litigation regime that has, until now at least, remained largely
opaque to the public and legislative overseers alike.
And yet, my analysis also suggests that greater transparency might be
a double-edged sword. It is possible, for instance, that efforts to improve
transparency may be self-defeating because they will exacerbate agency
pursuit of political rewards.166 Simply put, a gatekeeper agency subject to
pervasive political oversight may be more likely to privilege observable
bureaucratic outputs, such as public recoveries or win–loss ratios, over
other, potentially more public-interested tasks, such as minimizing costly
meritless litigation by terminating cases.167 Here, the above-noted reform
measures that more directly impact DOJ incentives—such as holding DOJ
liable for defendant fees and costs in declined cases that do not generate
recoveries or, alternatively, any shortfall below a statutorily set minimum
recovery—may prove the better reform avenue.168
Finally, and more broadly, my analysis suggests the need to revitalize
and reorient scholarly debate around regulatory design and the optimal
structure of law enforcement. Much of the existing theoretical literature
treats public and private enforcement as pure substitutes and a binary
choice in which a government that seeks to regulate undesirable behavior
chooses between purely public and purely private enforcement or specifies
a strict division of labor between the two.169 Yet all the while, many of our
most consequential regulatory regimes have evolved into hybrids of public
and private enforcement in which multiple enforcers—including federal
and state administrative agencies, private litigants, and state attorneys
general—operate and interact within complex “ecologies of
enforcement.”170 The institutional-design challenge in the present regulatory
165

Id. at 14–18.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting concern that agencies with gatekeeper powers
will pursue political rewards rather than the public interest); see also Gersen & Stephenson, supra note
37, at 40 (arguing that increased transparency may exacerbate agency vulnerability to “accountability
pathologies”). For a more technical working out of similar ideas, see Andrea Prat, The Wrong Kind of
Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862 (2005); and Justin Fox, Government Transparency and
Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23 (2007).
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See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
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See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 9. Classic contributions in this line of inquiry include Gary S.
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, supra note 24; and Polinsky, supra note 24.
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See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 7. A number of legal scholars have remarked on the evolution of
multienforcer regimes and have begun to explore the various political, social, and economic forces that
have fueled their emergence. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1; FARHANG, supra note 1; Margaret H.
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 486 (2012); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698
166

1753

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

landscape is not just determining whether public or private enforcement
should be given primary or exclusive domain labor, but also how to
structure institutions—or combinations of institutions—that can optimally
coordinate multiple, overlapping, and interdependent enforcement
mechanisms.
Going forward, two types of inquiry are in order, one theoretical and
the other empirical. On the theoretical side, we need better theories for
understanding what the ideal public enforcer role should be in a world of
coordinated public–private enforcement. By extension, we need better
models to understand how particular institutional designs—including the
FCA as well as a range of competing design proposals—might best
facilitate desired public management of available private enforcement
capacity. On the empirical side, we need more micro-institutional analyses
that can help us gauge how agency oversight works, or does not work, and
when it is likely to deviate from Part I’s gatekeeper ideal.171 This Article
hopefully takes a small step in both directions.

(2011); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010). Others have noted the increasingly blurred line between
administration and litigation, as agencies utilize litigation to achieve broad regulatory ends, see
ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1 (2009),
or step into a role normally reserved for private litigation efforts, pursuing monetary judgments via
“agency settlements” and then distributing the proceeds to private individuals or entities who have
suffered harm, see Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 539–40 (2011).
See generally Engstrom, supra note 5, at 7–8 (reviewing a growing scholarly literature that increasingly
focuses on the border between litigation and administration).
171
A good example is Quinn Mulroy, Public Regulation Through Private Litigation: The
Regulatory Power of Private Lawsuits and the American Bureaucracy (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 2012) (examining the relationship of the Equal Employment Opportunity Center (EEOC),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
(FHEO) to private enforcement under Title VII and cognate antidiscrimination statutes).
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APPENDIX
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
GOVT_INTERVENED
RECOVERYDOLLARS
LOGRECOVERYDOLLARS
DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT
911RESOURCECONSTRAINT
EXPERIENCEDRELATOR
TOPRELATORFIRM
MIDRELATORFIRM
FORTUNE100
DEFENSE50
TOPRELATORFIRM*FORTUNE100
MIDRELATORFIRM*FORTUNE100
HEALTH
DEFENSE
INTERIOR
NINTHCIRCUITRULING
CASEFILEDDEM
CASEELECTEDDEM
CASEFILEDYEAR
CASEELECTEDYEAR
CASECLOSEDYEAR
TRIPLEKILLINGSWORTH
AFTERNINTH
NINTHCIRCUIT
INTERVENNINTHCIRCUIT
INTERVENKILLINGSWORTH
BUSH43DEFENSE
INTERVENDEFENSE
CASEELECTEDCLINTON
CASEELECTEDBUSH43
CASEELECTEDOBAMA
TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE

Mean
0.279
5.913
4.819
0.721
38.436
0.163
0.110
0.378
0.095
0.064
0.015
0.034
0.557
0.188
0.015
0.172
0.506
0.519
2000.971
2002.720
2003.474
0.047
0.947
0.194
0.172
0.264
0.051
0.066
0.055
0.342
0.449
0.177

Std.
Dev.
0.449
38.365
6.870
0.170
130.588
0.369
0.313
0.485
0.294
0.246
0.122
0.181
0.497
0.391
0.121
0.378
0.500
0.500
5.231
5.380
5.006
0.211
0.224
0.395
0.378
0.441
0.220
0.248
0.228
0.475
0.497
0.381

Min

Max

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1987
1987
1989
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1131.854
20.847
1.070
729
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2011
2012
2012
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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